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INTRODUCTION

In the following chapters we will
carry out an

inspection of how the internal political
configurations,
institutions, routines, and domestic developments
affected
the conduct of foreign policy in the Soviet
Union and the

United States between 1945 and 1948. By unfolding
the
circumstances around the eruption of the Cold War, we
might

gam

a valuable insight into the interrelatedness
of

internal political conditions and foreign policy.
The twentieth century has been the century of wars.
Half of its so far elapsed ninety- four years witnessed

global conflicts which were called "war". Since Walter

Lippmann's landmark 1947 book we have known that wars can

differ not only in intensity and dimension, but also in
temperature, and it was this "Cold War" that dominated world

politics between the mid- forties and the late eighties.
Opinions diverge concerning the starting point of the
Cold War. According to some assessments, the Cold War

started in 1917 when the Bolshevik Coup established a regime
openly hostile to the Western capitalist democracies and, in
return,

the Western states launched an abortive and

disorganized intervention to dispose of the Red Menace.
Others believe that World War II turned into Cold War

following V-E Day, originating from the Soviets' violation
of the Yalta Agreements. More widely accepted views attach

1

the New Year's Day of the Cold War
calendar to events like

Stalin's February, 1946 preelection speech,
Churchill's
Fulton speech, the announcement of the
Greek-Turkish Aid
(Truman Doctrine)
the Soviet pullout from the
Paris

,

negotiations of the European Recovery Program (Marshall
Plan)

,

the Berlin Blockade,

the Vandenberg resolution, or

the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, depending
on which

issues the student considers to be the major cause.

Those who believe that the main source of the Soviet-

American conflicts was the deep-seated differences in the
philosophical, ideological, historical, and moral heritage
of the two societies,

that is intrinsic factors,

tend to

trace the beginning back to 1917. If one finds the causes in

external events as in the changes in the European balanceof -power and in the Soviet conduct following World War II,

the starting point is likely to be identified with one of
the above mentioned series of post-war events

1

.

Naturally, one is not bound in evaluating the Cold War
era to adhere to a single set of causes, or search by any

means a fixed date for its eruption. The Cold War was the
result of complex historical, political, philosophical, and

psychological developments that embrace not decades, but
several centuries. Traditions of the Western societies go

back as far as the ancient Greeks and Romans, incorporating
the results of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as

1

Graebner (1962),

p.

218.
2

well as those of nineteenth century
liberal political
thought. As opposed to this, the
philosophical creed of
Communism is of more recent origin and
evolved purposefully
as a sharp departure from the course
of Western development
and as a response to the ugly inequalities
having originated
from the industrial revolution. Furthermore,
while Western
states were the cradles of civil liberties and
liberal
ical institutions, and many of them have
exercised

democracy since the American War of Independence and
the
French Revolution, Russia shifted from one of the most
repressive authoritarian regimes to the most ruthless

totalitarian regime in history. As a result of these
historical determinants, the political institutions and the
entire policy making process followed a different pattern in
the Soviet Union and in the most prominent representative of
the Western democracies,

the United States 2

.

Nonetheless, this thesis concentrates on the intrinsic
causes of the Cold War. As a part of our main line of

argument we will claim that there was not a significant

possibility of altering or influencing the policies of the
Soviet Union, because of the secretiveness of the system,
and because particular actions were often not taken as a

response to certain Western steps, but as a part of a

strategy that was determined by primarily domestic factors.
We will elaborate on the nature of the factional debates
2

Bialer and Mandelbaum, chp.

2;
3

Ryavec, pp.

11-16.

within and around the Politburo, and
attempt to discover the
connections between these struggles and
the foreign policy
outcomes. We will show that the basic
assumptions of

American foreign policy toward the Soviet
Union evolved
during 1945-1946, were converted into
concrete policies
during 1947-48 through compromises and
cooperation between
the President and the Congress, and were
affected by the
proposals and activities of Henry Wallace, Truman's
primary
adversary on issues concerning the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, an inspection of personal political

predilections and beliefs of individual leaders on both
sides will be carried out along the lines of the previous

chapter
The thesis is divided into three main sections. In the
first part we will provide a theoretical discussion on the

question of how internal factors affect foreign policy by an
analysis of the existing literature and by developing a new

approach on the basis of our findings. In the second part we
will turn to our case studies. The discussion of the

relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy in
the Soviet Union starts with the presentation of the general

characteristics of postwar Soviet politics under Stalin.
This is necessary because understanding the Soviet policy-

making process and the motives of decisions is impossible
without pointing out how sharply they differed from the

Western models. After getting acquainted with the main
4

characters of the events, we will
investigate the central
issues of domestic politics during
our period that affected
the attitudes of the leading
politicians towards foreign
policy. Subsequently, we will turn to
the area of foreign
policy, and show how it was influenced
by the main

characters of the competing factions and
Stalin, and attempt
to explain the reasons of the shift in
foreign policy that
took place during 1947.
Since the American political system lies within
our
traditional understanding of politics, we will not
elaborate
on its operation in this paper. Following an
overview of the

immediate postwar American politics, first we will
discuss
how the Truman Administration during 1945-1946 came
to

revise the basic attitude of President Roosevelt toward the
Soviet Union, then we will show how the entire course of

American foreign policy was altered by 1949 as a result of
the interactions among the President, the Congress, and

Henry Wallace, Presidential Candidate and challenger to
Truman's foreign policy throughout 1947-1948.
In the third section we will provide an assessment of

Soviet and American foreign policy in terms of their being

constrained by domestic factors and we will relate the
empirical findings to the theoretical assertions laid down
in the first chapter. The thesis will be completed by a

brief conclusion.

5

CHAPTER

1

INTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

International relations deals with the interaction
of
nations. Since 1648, it has been the state,
as the prime
embodiment of a nation's sovereignty, that most
frequently
has communicated will and intentions between
nations.
Generally, governments or regimes representing states

articulate and coordinate their attitudes and strategies
in
relation to other states in the form of a comprehensive
foreign policy. Although foreign policy, like any

communicative action, is in large part constituted of
responses to incoming stimuli, that is other states'
behavior, significant events, general external developments,

these are not the sole determinants

an equally important

-

component comes from inside the state. This thesis explores
the internal factors that influence a nation's foreign

policy
As has been noted,

foreign policy is drawn up by the

regime that controls the state. According to Salmore and
Salmore, a "regime is defined as the role or set of roles in
a national political system in which inheres the power to

make authoritative policy decisions" 3

.

The desired goal of a

regime is to obtain and retain power, and it acts rationally
in the respect that it attempts to use its resources
3

Salmore and Salmore,

p.

103.
6

efficiently in order to achieve these ends.
The term
rational here should not suggest, in
opposition to the
argument of many realist analysts, that all
decision makers
operate with the same approach and act in the
same way under
the same circumstances. "Decision makers
vary significantly
in choice propensities, beliefs, and
personality traits.

These characteristics structure the decision-makers'
range
of goals and shape the analysis of alternatives
by the

decision maker. Insofar as possible, a policy-maker's
choices are selected which are consistent with these

principles and constitute the boundaries of rational

behavior for the decision-maker" 4

.

These points indicate the need to follow a two- fold

technique in our investigations. On the one hand, foreign

policy is influenced and constrained by resources available
for the regime to realize its conceptions. As we will argue,

resources are determined mostly by non-personal or
structural components originating outside the personality of
the individual leaders. These include in addition to the

geographical conditions and economic capabilities of the
country,

the type of the regime, prevalent methods for

arranging political affairs, internal cohesion of the
governing group, or the relationship of the leaders and the
led towards each other.

4

Walker, pp. 404-405.
7

On the other hand, we need to take
into consideration
the idiosyncratic features of those
who conceive of and

implement foreign policy. The factors belonging
into this
area arise from inside the individuals, they
vary from

person to person, and affect behavior differently.
When
discussing these issues we utilize the findings
of cognitive
psychology, belief system, and operational code
theories.

By carrying out these examinations we aim to
set up an

explanatory model for foreign policy formation. We will
step
beyond the die-hard rational actor model and give a weighed
credit to idiosyncratic influences. As our title shows, we

did not select the accepted term "domestic", since it

downplays several aspects this paper emphasizes. However,
our imposing limits on rationality does not mean that we

intend to erase that notion from our vocabulary.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the isolationist - turned-

internationalist said in the 1940s that "politics stops at
the water's edge". Being a leading Republican politician

(potential presidential candidate in 1944)

and the number

one authority in the GOP in the foreign policy area, his

pronouncements were influential. Indeed, this sentence soon
became the basis of the bipartisan American foreign policy
(apart from occasional discords as the debate over China)

and remained so until the controversies of the Vietnam War.
Vandenberg'

s

goal was to make foreign policy immune from the

8

fluctuations and partisan fightings of
domestic politics.
This was especially necessary after the
1946 elections when
the Republican party for a short period
regained
the

majority in the Congress, and in the context
of the shock
caused by the breakup of the Grand Coalition
the new

superpower could not afford an inconsistent and
defensive
foreign behavior.
However, these remarks beg the question: is it
possible
to completely bifurcate foreign and domestic
politics? Can

we make foreign policy immune from internal influences?
We

will not spend much time for proving our answer, which
is

clearly "no"; the entire argument in the following pages
will make it apparent.
As a first step, we need to articulate the basic

assumptions that will assist us in our further
investigations. According to the mainstream realist
approach, the ultimate aim of states is to preserve their

sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are three
factors that determine a state's behavior vis-a-vis other
states: the degree of functional differentiation among
states,

the character of the international system, and the

distribution of capabilities. Since, as Waltz argues, there
is no functional differentiation among states,

and the

international system is anarchic, lacking a central

legitimate authority, and is unlikely to develop a

hierarchic order, the sole factor that affects a state's
9

international behavior is its relative
capabilities. Further
developing this argument realists claim
that similarly

situated states behave similarly, regardless
of their
different domestic structures.
In opposition to this approach we argue
that there is a

close relationship between a state's internal

characteristics and its international behavior. Both
are
mutually inseparable: it is not possible for a
leadership to
pursue a foreign policy by completely ignoring the
domestic
context of the actions, and vice versa, any measures in
the

domestic political field must be contemplated, designed, and

implemented by taking into consideration their international
repercussions

A logical continuation of this point is that different
domestic structures affect foreign policy differently. If
the domestic context is favorable, the leaders will be faced

with an easier task when conducting the state's foreign
policy. Similarly,

inconvenient internal circumstances pose

greater difficulties for the decision makers. In order to

understand the exact nature of this relationship, we need to
examine the different types of domestic structures that
occur in the international arena, and explore what sort of

influence they exert on the state's foreign behavior.
As it has been pointed out above, a regime's primary

goal is to maximize its political support and, ultimately,
its power. Consequently,

their political, including
10

diplomatic strategies are constrained by
their need to
remain in office. Leaders opt for war,
negotiations,
sanctions, economic measures, not so much
according to the
intrinsic value of each of these actions, but
chiefly in
terms of their likely impacts on the government's
political
fortunes

A large number of scholars have concerned themselves
with the study of the different ways regimes constrain
foreign policy. These approaches can be arranged into two
groups

.

The underlying idea in the studies belonging to the

first group centers around the notion of accountability. As

they argue, closed societies, where there is a low degree of

accountability, are not, or are only to a very low degree

constrained by domestic political influences, whereas in
open regimes this influence is strong. The second group, in
contrast, acknowledges the possibility of the phenomenon

rejected by the former group.
One of the earliest works that aimed to inspect the

issue belongs to R. Barry Farrell. He contended that

political conditions in open and closed systems are

fundamentally different. Open polities have much opposition,
because they have "competitive, regular electoral contests,

legalized two- or multi-party organizations aimed at
offering alternative governmental leadership, a high degree
of toleration for autonomous groups in politics, and an

acceptance of constitutional restraints on governmental
11

power". As opposed to this, closed
systems are largely
immune from visible domestic constraints.
The characteristic
features of the "totalitarian" regimes include
"an official
ideology, a single mass party, a system of
terroristic

policy control, near complete party control
of all means of
mass communication, and central control of the
entire
5
economy"
.

In a later, and more sophisticated project
called CREON

(Comparative Research on the Events of Nations)

,

Salmore and

Salmore went further, but fundamentally remained within
the
confines of the previous studies. They developed a threefold system of criteria that describe the manner regimes

constrain foreign policy formation. The important factors
are the following:

(l)

the regime's disposal,

the amount of political resources at
(2)

political constraints,

(3)

the

regime's disposition to use the resources at its disposal.
The availability of resources varies according to the scope
of societal activity under the control of the regime,

to the

degree of political institutionalization, and public
support

.

Regimes with wide governmental scope and an

efficacious and complex bureaucracy will face fewer

dificulties during foreign policy formation and
implementation. Political constraints include the degree of

coherence within the regime, accountability, and the extent
the leadership represents the society. Diverse societal
5

Farrell, pp. 167-208.
12

interests and rules of attaining and
retaining political
office also contribute to the relationship.
According to
Salmore and Salmore, military governments
and one party
systems are less constrained, since they are
generally
immune from doctrinal or ideological differences.
The third
factor depends on two aspects: on the extent
to which

regimes are willing to change the rules of the
political
game in order to achieve power and implement policy,
and on
their commitment to expand either the resource base
of the

society or its control over it. Governments that are

maximalist or expansionist will be less constrained than

minimalist or status quo leaderships 6

.

Wilkenf eld in his IBA (Interstate Behavior Model) model

approaches the question from a slightly different
perspective. As he points out, it is the "formal

institutional factors", such as legislatures and
bureaucracies,

"linkage mechanisms", for instance public

opinion, and "political system aggregate descriptor

variables", referring to the overall features of the

political system, we need to direct our attention to. At a
later stage when discussing political conflicts he finds
that "within certain groups of nations
a relationship between internal

and external

(foreign)

.

there tends to be

(domestic)

conflict behavior

.

.

conflict behavior", and there is a

tendency for internal and external conflict behavior to
6

Salmore and Salmore, pp. 103-122.
13

occur simultaneously, or for one of them
to be followed in
time by the other. He argues that in
relatively open types
of regimes

(personalist

,

polyarchic)

there are cases when a

pattern of mutual reinforcement appears in which
a certain
pair of internal and external conflict measures
occur in
succession. In these states neither external, nor
internal

measures can be taken in isolation of each other.
However,
in centrist states the primary characteristic
of which is

centralized control of most aspects of life, the leadership
does not have to concern itself with the internal

repercussions of external events 7

.

All these models place disproportionately great weight
on the concept of accountability. They claim that the

primary, and often sole source of constraint originates from
the existence of legitimate opposition and certain

constitutional procedures. Furthermore, they downplay the

possibilities of political divisions in closed societies. In
fact,

due to the diffusion of power across institutional and

bureaucratic groups there exist political constraints in
totalitarian or centrist regimes. In such structures
leadership is often collective, and power must be shared

with other groups of authority. Conflict within the regime
can be intense, and foreign policy decision making highly

politicized because of the presence of competing belief
7

Wilkenfeld, pp. 107-123.
14

systems and institutional interests, and as
a result of the
continuous struggle for power and position among
high ranked
officials

An alternative approach toward the issue
would

concentrate on regime level factors that place
constraints
on foreign policy. Two such components might
be regime

fragmentation and vulnerability. The former of these
concepts

concerns the degree to which a government's

central political leadership is fragmented by persisting,

internal political divisions in the form of competing

personalities, institutions/bureaucracies, factions, or

competing parties or other such groups". Ultimately, it
involves a single leader's ability to dominate the political

environment

8
.

Furthermore,

it is necessary to take into

consideration not only the decision making unit's direct
impact on the policy outcome, but also the extent to which

additional factors within the unit exert influence on the

decision making process.
If the regime is pervasively controlled by a

predominant leader, we need to know about his political
style.

If he is insensitive,

knowledge about his personality

might offer sufficient clues to understand the process. But
if he is sensitive to external stimuli,

we are compelled to

inspect other aspects of the political life. When no one

individual has the ability to routinely determine the
8

Hagan, pp. 343-346.
15

position of the government, but the
influential actors
gather in a single group, we are required
to find

out about

the consensus building ability of the
group. If agreement
occurs quickly, we need to learn about the
group's internal
dynamics. If there emerges difficulty in this
process,

additional information is necessary. Finally, in
order to
describe the operation of multiple autonomous groups,
the

relationship of these associations provides us with
cues. If
they do not deny each other's legitimacy, they are

likely to

eventually come to an agreement. If, however, they do so, a
deadlock in the decision making process is almost
inevitable 9

.

Examining the constraints springing from inside the
regime, we need to take a look at the significance of the

relationship between the leadership and the wider political
environment. Hagan argues that "if a leadership does face

significant challenges to its position, it will likely avoid
actions that could provoke controversies that, in turn,

might help opposing political parties or other groups (e.g.,
the military)

to force its removal from office". The best

way to measure regime vulnerability is to examine the
frequency of changes in the political leadership over a

particular period of time. Hagan asserts that the most
fragmented and the most vulnerable regimes will have to cope

with the greatest constraints during their operation.
9

Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, pp. 309-338.
16

Symptoms of a highly constrained foreign
policy behavior are
ambiguous verbal statements, inconsistent
pronouncements,
controversy avoidance, and diplomacy
characterized by low
intensity and occasional hostility 10
.

In addition to regime fragmentation
and vulnerability,

the legitimacy of a state's institutions
is also an

important aspect that needs to be taken into
account. If an
institution is legitimate, the politicians or
officials may
be willing to place its survival ahead of their
own personal
and group interests, and accommodate internal
concerns
to

external pressures. If the institution lacks legitimacy,

officials are likely to despoil the state to maximize their
own selfish group interests, and block essential changes

necessary to develop an effective foreign policy

11
.

Snyder approaches the issue of regime level constraints
oft

foreign policy in different terms. The least constrained

regimes are what he calls the cartelized systems in which

parochial interests have the greatest opportunity to control
state policy. In such a system bargaining among compact

groups with different, highly concentrated interests

proceeds by logrolling: each group gets what it wants most
in return for tolerating the adverse effects of the policies

its coalition partners desire. Each logroller has a stronger

10

Hagan, pp. 346-350.

11

Larson (1991), pp

.

85-111.
17

incentive to pursue its parochial
interests than to promote
the collective good.

Unitary systems are more constrained
than cartelized
ones. Here interests are diffuse and
encompassing: the
ruling oligarchy's assets and skills are
mobile across
economic and bureaucratic sectors. It has no
parochial

reason to back the success of some sectors over
the others,
or to engage in logrolling. As proprietor
of the national
economy it has little incentive for risky policies.

However,

Snyder also credits the possibility that single leaders
may
slip out of control. The most constrained regime

type is the

democratic one, although institutions even in such a system

may work imperfectly and create cartelized blocs within
different segments of the elected government 12

.

After concluding our investigations in the area of
structural and systemic constraints on a state's foreign
policy, we turn our attention to factors that originate on
the level of the individual. The following discussion will

be based upon the findings of cognitive psychology, belief
system, and operational code theories. We will argue that in

addition to non-personal influences, policy outcomes are
affected by idiosyncratic determinants. As opposed to the
classical rational actor model that describes states as

billiard balls or black boxes, assuming that under the same
12

Snyder ("Myths..."), pp. 21-66.
18

circumstances actors handle issues with the
same approach
and, supposedly, arrive at the same
decision, the above
mentioned theories acknowledge the existence
of individual
specific strategies. They contend that each
person perceives
the environment differently, and different
perceptions

about

the world result in different actions. How
do individuals

perceive the world? How do they handle incoming data?
How do
they synthesize them? How do the constructed
perceptions
constrain the relationship of the individual and the
environment? How do these procedures relate to political,
and especially foreign policy decision making? In order to

answer these questions, first we need to take a look at the
contributions of cognitive psychology to the issue.

According to the basic findings of cognitive
psychology, the two ultimate characteristics of human

cognition are the top-down processing of new information,
that is matching and assimilating it into preexisting

structures, and limited computational capacities, that is
the prevalence of simplifying mechanisms. These structures
or mechanisms are called schemas which are generic concepts

stored in the memory. They might be a collection of

subjective theories constructed by generalizing one's own
experiences. A subset of schemas can be called analogies
that are specific schemas, and they also operate in the

above fashion.

19

The schema structure generates
prototypes against which
specific examples can be compared. It
not only helps
interpret incoming data, but also allows
us to go beyond
them, and its "default values" create
a more complete
picture

There are numerous schemas stored in our
mind, and they
are recalled according to the particular
situation. Because
of our inclination to simplification, we
tend to recall

schemas that are most readily available and for
doing so we
rely on superficial commonalities without probing
more

deeply or widely in search of less obvious but perhaps
more
relevant patterns A schema choice also involves the
.

assessment of the fit between the incoming stimuli and the
repertoire of available schemas stored in memory. We make a

similarity judgement of the extent the situation we are
facing matches the memory evoked. Certain schemas are

destined to be more influential by personal, generational,
and career experiences; and if these factors reinforce each
other,

the analogy may become extraordinarily powerful.

Once a schema has been constructed and stored in
memory, and has proved to work under specific circumstances,

modifying or altering it requires an extended exposure to
contrary experience, and it will usually not erode even if a
series of unparallels between them and reality are pointed
out

20

On the basis of these assumptions
Khong develops an
Analogical Explanation (AE) framework in
order to answer the
central question: how do analogies influence
the selection
of policy alternatives? According to
this theory,

analogies

perform six diagnostic tasks: define the nature
of the
situation confronting the policy-maker; assess

the stakes;

provide prescriptions; help predict alternative
options'
chances of success; evaluate their moral rightness;

and warn

about dangers associated with the options 13

.

Khong claims that if it is proved that an analogy
was

used at important junctures in the policy process, then
we
can accept that it affected the decisions. This is the
point
where research in the field of cognitive psychology relates

tooperational code theory. Operational code theory was

initiated by Nathan Leites's book "The Operational Code of
the Politburo"

that was developed into a exhaustive

(1951)

monograph about Bolshevism two years later. In "A Study of
Bolshevism" Leites attempted to "study the spirit of a
ruling group
of]

.

code,

.

.

.

.

.

[through]

its doctrine

that is,

.

.

.

.

.

what

the analysis of

.

(he)

call(s)

[one aspect

the operational

the conceptions of political 'strategy'" 14

.

Sixteen years later Alexander George undertook the

development of Leites's approach to a comprehensive model
for studying political behavior and decision making. His aim
13

Khong, pp. 24-25.; Snyder ("Myths..."), pp. 26-31.

14

cited in Walker, p. 404.
21

was to concentrate primarily on the
"maxims of political
strategy" solely as beliefs rather than
on the

psychoanalytically based, characterological aspects,
and
underlined the cognitive as opposed to the affective
elements of the issue. He classified the basic
beliefs of
political leaders into two groups. Whereas philosophical

beliefs refer to assumptions and premises about the
fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political
conflict, and the role of the individual in history,

instrumental beliefs focus upon ends-means relationships in
the context of political actions 15

.

George also identified two techniques to detect the
impact of operational - code beliefs upon decisions. The core
of the model is the process tracing and the congruency

procedure. Process tracing is a methodology that shows how
the actor's beliefs and other factors influenced his

assessment of the situation and his choice of action,
whereas the congruence procedure by specifying a set of

expected outcomes based on one's theoretical perspective and
checking them against actual outcomes establishes

consistency between the content of given beliefs and the
content of decisions 16

.

Subsequent studies went a step further and attempted to
link personality, beliefs, perceptions, and foreign policy
15

George (1969), pp. 190-222.

16

George (1979), pp. 95-124.
22

behavior. These investigations found
several different
patterns for the relationship of the above
factors. One
possible chain of causation detected by
Starr suggests a
straightforward link between beliefs, perceptions,
and
behavior: Beliefs --> Perceptions of the
Object --> Behavior
towards the Object. However, as Walker noted,
the linkages
may be more complex. "For example: the instrumental
beliefs
in an individual's operational code may
prescribe the same

behavior toward different types of objects. Therefore
obj ect -percept ions would vary, but behavior would
not. The

philosophical beliefs in an operational code may dispose an
actor to diagnose differently the respective situations

surrounding two objects of the same type or even the same
object at two different observation points. Therefore,

object-perceptions would not vary, but behavior would" 17

.

Both the model set up with the assistance of cognitive

psychology and the operational code theory builds on a
-

larger concept called "belief system". The ultimate

problemat ique around the entire area is the nature of the
"filtering device" of existing beliefs about empirical and

normative isues. How do these devices differentiate
important from uninportant data? To what extent are decision

makers affected by their preconceived views?
Belief systems are a set of ideas and thoughts

concerning the environment that are held relatively
17

Walker, p

.

414
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constant. According to Holsti, belief
systems have a "dual
connection with decision-making. The direct
relationship is
found in that aspect of the belief system
which tells us
'what ought to be', acting as a direct
guide in the

establishment of goals. The indirect link

...

arises from

the tendency of the individual to assimilate
new perceptions
to familiar ones, and to distort what is
seen in such way as
to minimize the clash with previous expectations" 18
.

When examining belief systems, many themes we have

discussed in the preceding pages reoccur. Since policies are
usually developed by a number of actors, the belief systems
or images of the individuals interact. In this case we need
to develop a collective belief system for the group which is

the aggregation of individual beliefs. When there is one

person acting as a principal force affecting the formulation
and implementation of decisions, his belief system has a

disproportionate share in the collective belief system. In
such cases the establishment of a balance of power among the

group's constituent members is helpful. In order for a

decision making group to operate effectively a minimal level
of agreement between its members' belief systems is

required. Those bodies where there is a high degree of

overlap among the individuals' belief systems are likely to
arrive at consensus rapidly, whereas worldview differences

18

cited in Little and Smith, eds
24

.

,

p.

12.

result in difficulties in
developing coherent policy
intragovernment ally 19
.

Throughout the preceding pages
we have reviewed the
existing literature concerning
the internal determinants
of
foreign policy. In doing so we
attempted to find the most
appropriate ways they might be helpful
to understand
the

relationship between these two
spheres of politics. We have
pointed out, contrary to mainstream
realism, that a state's

domestic conditions do exert influence
on its behavior visa-vis other states. Since a regime's
primary goal is to stay
in office, maximize its political
support and, ultimately,
its power, the adoption of any policy
takes place in this
context. On the basis of these assertions
we accepted the

following set of criteria:

1

.

Governments in both open and closed societies
are
constrained in conducting their foreign policies.

2

.

The adequate method to examine the impact of
domestic

structure on foreign policy is regime fragmentation
and
vulnerability. The most fragmented and vulnerable states

win
3.

have to cope with the greatest constraints.

States with legitimate institutions are more likely to

develop an effective foreign policy than those without.

19

Rosati, pp. 15-38.
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4.

If in a state parochial
interests evolve and control
the

state policy, they are able to
ignore many of the
constraints imposed on them by the
structure they operate
m. Regimes with encompassing interests
or governments
surrounded by democratic- constitutional
regulations
cannot easily bypass constraints.
5

.

Decision making individuals are
constrained by the
processes their cognition inherently
follows.

6.

Belief systems shared by political
leaders predispose
them toward and turn them away from
certain kinds of
actions

26

CHAPTER

2

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN
POLICY IN THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES,

1945-1948

2.1

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
in the Soviet
Union, 1945-1948

2.1.1

The General Characteristics of Postwar
Soviet

Politics Under Stalin

The condition that ultimately left an
imprint on Soviet
life in the late 1940s was that after
Germany, the Soviet

Union suffered the most severe devastation of
all countries
during World War II. As a result of a series of
formal and
informal agreements between the Soviet Union, the
United
States, and Great Britain, Stalin,

in return for American

Lend-Lease and British weapon and food supplies, agreed
that
he would keep the German troops engaged in the Eastern
front

until the other two members of the Grand Alliance had gained

sufficient strength to be able to win in the Western
front 20

.

During four years of the "Great Patriotic War" the

Soviet Union lost twenty million people and approximately
$128 billion worth of industrial capital was destroyed.

The German invasion in 1941 necessitated extraordinary

measures in the political and administrational sphere. It
20

Taubman

,

pp

.

41-47.
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was no longer possible to
maintain strict discipline to
the
extent it had been feasible during
the twenties and
thirties. The bulk of the attention
of the leadership and
the energy of the country had
to be devoted to the war
effort. This did not bring about
anything that can be
referred to as "freedom" in the
Western sense, but the
loosening grip was certainly felt by
the Russian (and all
the Soviet) people. Stalin had to
"liberalize" many aspects
of the political system; Western
influence was tolerated for
the first time since the Revolution.
Derogatory articles

concerning the capitalist countries
disappeared from the
newspapers and, as many contemporary observers

noted, even

anti-Western jokes were banned

21
.

The tasks of the party and

the secret police had to be redefined;
nationalist feelings

and religious sentiments were allowed to evoke
the

atmosphere necessary for a successful war which was
fought
not for the Party or for Communism, but for
"Mother Russia".

Some degree of private initiative appeared, especially
in

agriculture, in order to supply the army and the

population 22

.

These unusual circumstances were highly unfavorable for
the Soviet system. The leadership in Moscow was witnessing a

dangerous disintegration of the party, first of all in the

occupied territories. In Leningrad the number of party
21

Conquest (1991), chp.

22

Dunmore, p.

4.

1.
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members went down from 150,000
to 16,000, in the Ukraine
from 500,000 to 16,000. The
structure of the society and
the
administrative apparatus was either
destroyed or terribly
shaken, and although there was
a widespread and so far

unparalleled expectation for a genuine
change in the nature
of the system,

this lethal process had to be
halted. It was
indispensable to eradicate laxity,
restore discipline and
central control, since the very
existence of the

"dictatorship of the proletariat" was
at stake. It was this
party revival that became the core of
Stalin's immediate
post-war policies 23
.

The political system that served as a
tool in the
dictator's hand was often looked upon by
Western observers
as a monolithic one with Stalin in the
center and a very

small number of people around him. They have
assumed that

important decisions were made solely in this narrow
body,
but even within it the most significant factor
was Stalin's
wish
In fact,

in the Soviet policy making process there were

different patterns at work simultaneously. As far as the
general characteristics of the regime is concerned, it was

overwhelmingly totalitarian, centralized, and repressive.
Stalin and the Politburo were the ultimate place where

decisions were made. The input side to the system was
insignificant, there was practically no response for
23

McCagg, p. 12 0.
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pressures coming from below, or more
exactly such pressures
were nonexistent. The directions
issued at the supreme level
were implemented without questioning,
and in order to secure
this, the state bureaucracy was
constantly harassed by the
leadership's agents, the secret police,
and the party
apparatus
However, at the organizational level
the picture needs to
be refined. The bureaucracy was far
more important from the
point of view of managing the entire
Soviet system. The
senior administrators played a key role
ensuring that

measures were carried out. Decisions were
largely
predictable, since they were dictated by the
official

ideology of the Party and the Politburo orders.

A third, more "pluralistic" pattern in the Soviet
policy
making process meant that there were various views
and

interests present at the different levels of the hierarchy,
and decisions were born as a result of compromises between
the different interest groups 24

.

There is no consensus about the precise extent of

Stalin's power in the Politburo. Even at the highest level
it is not adequate to claim that it was exclusively Stalin

whose will had an impact on the output side of Soviet
politics. On the one hand, he was practically an

unchallenged leader. His relationship with his Politburo
colleagues is most frequently presented as one between a
24

Dunmore, pp. 6-9.
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Master and his servants. Milovan
Djilas recalled in his
remembrance volume that Molotov had

the habit of following

Stalin wherever he went with a small
notebook in his hand
and put down each of the Leader's
words 25 Stalin often
treated the Politburo members like
toys: for instance in the
early fifties he excluded Molotov,
Mikoyan, and Voroshilov
from Politburo meetings simply by not
inviting
.

them.

If he

wanted to have a policy accepted he knew
the Politburo would
not support, he asked their endorsement
without letting them
know about the contents of the issue 26
However,

.

the Politburo no longer consisted of

inexperienced people. They were all senior politicians;
Molotov, Andreyev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan had
been members

since the twenties 27

,

and Stalin could not remove them at

will. There were no killings between 1945 and
1949, then

Voznesenskii was excluded and executed. Until 1953 there
were only two more dismissals, Popov and Andreyev, but

neither was arrested 28

.

Furthermore, throughout the last decade of his life,

Stalin was suffering from recurrent bouts of debilitating
ill health,

which limited his ability to supervise policy

implementation in a really detailed and sustained manner.
25

Djilas, p. 134.

26

Khrushchev, pp. 278-281.

27

Conquest (1991), pp

28

.

105-141.

Dunmore, pp. 12-18.
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After his February

9,

1946 preelection speech he
delivered

only one more public speech, at
the Nineteenth Party
Congress in 1952, but even there he
spoke only briefly and
many observers considered it merely
a ceremonial appearance.
Nonetheless, he remained the supreme
authority in virtually
all areas, and it seems very unlikely
that anyone from the
Politburo would have dared to turn against
him.
Instead,

they were fighting fiercely among
themselves to gain a
favorable position where they could exert
more influence on
the Master's decisions 29
.

Confronting factions or groupings sharing different
ideological, philosophical assumptions within a
country's

political system are generally referred to as "Left"
and
"Right", and this distinction is often applied
to describe

Soviet politics, as well 30
of political trends and

.

However, traditional definitions

approaches often prove inadequate

in relation to the Soviet Union. Disputes between the

different factions were mainly personal

struggles for power

and influence, rather than moving along any particular

consistent ideological line or a specific issue - orientation
No policy was adopted by a group if it was backed by the
opponent, but after the outcome of the struggle had been

determined, it was safe for the victor to adopt the loser's

platform if it was considered a viable approach. The entire
29
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Shulman, pp. 4-5.
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nature of these conflicts followed
a "feudal" pattern:
representatives of the individual groupings
invested their
subordinates, whenever possible, with
power and positions in
return for personal loyalty and allegiance.
They promoted
the interests of their clients,
thereby increased their own
power. Ideological positions adopted
on issues did
not

necessarily reflect personal predilections,
but rather the
obligations of various leaders to their
subordinates and allies. In order to become an
accepted
leader and to gain a solid power base, it was
advisable

for

a person to establish himself as the only
genuine and

orthodox executor of Leninism and as the sole scientific
interpreter of history with the implicit claim of
infallibility. Because of the lack of constitutional,

legitimized rules for power transfer, practically all
changes in the leadership could be achieved exclusively by
coups 31

.

Stalin, quite understandably, did little to

discourage disputes. He did not have to fight for
preeminence, he was still on top. Additionally, allowing his

principal officers to contend with one another enabled him
to disengage himself from the day-to-day "micromanagement"
of politics,

to examine alternative courses of action and,

at the same time ensure that his lieutenants became less

likely to combine forces against him.
31

Ra'anan, pp. 7-11.
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2.1.2

The Main Characters beside Stalin

Until very recently sources and documents
on the
background of specific Soviet political
decisions, including
minutes and records of the sessions of top
decision making
bodies were scarce, or completely unavailable
for

researchers. As a result, discord prevails among
students of
Soviet politics concerning the causes of certain
policies
and the aims of individuals, especially in the
Stalinist
era. As one prominent Russian analyst put it
in a 1993

publication,

"this article is one possible version, an

original reconstruction of historical phenomena and
events,
the true fabric of which is still being carefully
concealed

from the public" 32

.

According to one view, which seems to be more widely
accepted and that insists on the usual left- right
distinction, there were two distinct groupings located on
the two sides of the political palette between 1945 and
1948. The leftist group was led by Andrei Zhdanov and

Nikolai Voznesenskii

.

It had built up strong ties with most

of the foreign Communist parties,

especially with the

Yugoslavian and Bulgarian ones, and found its supporting
basis in the party apparatus. The rightist wing was

represented by Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beriya. This
faction that was backed by senior officials in economic
32

Alekseyev, p. 13.
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ministries, the secret police,
and the Caucasian party
leaders, also had some connections
with Communist parties,
but in general did not maintain
close relations with foreign
parties
The Zhdanov group, runs the
line of this interpretation
occupied a militant, dogmatic stance
on foreign and domestic
issues. It instigated unalloyed
hostility toward the West,
urged aggressive use of foreign
communists and mass action
of the proletariat to achieve rapid
subjugation
in the

Eastern European countries. As opposed
to this, the Malenkov
group advocated a less forward, or militant
international
policy. They showed little interest in
the affairs
of

Eastern Europe and were less directly
associated with
foreign relations 33
.

In our thesis we will develop a different
train of

thought. A closer look at the main characters of
these

factional debates will help elucidate the issue.
Zhdanov's

political fortunes before and during the war were
determined
by the successes and failures of the international
ventures
he supported (he had been appointed chairman of the
Supreme

Soviet

s

Foreign Affairs Committee in 1938)

,

and his

activity as the leader of the Leningrad Party organization.
During 1939 and 1940 he derived prestige from having been
one of the main architects of the Hitler- Stalin Pact, and

continued to defend the relationship with Berlin even after
33

Ra'anan, Shulman, etc.
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Germany had built up substantial
forces along the Soviet
border. Zhdanov argued that
there was no danger of a
Nazi
attack, since Germany could
not fight a two-front war.
1939 he also advocated the
invasion of Finland, probably
because of its strategic importance
for Leningrad 34

m

.

The debacle in Finland further
discredited Zhdanov, while
the events of June, 1941 ultimately
doomed his wartime
35
position
.

Molotov, as the father of the Nazi
-Bolshevik pact, was
also
serious trouble. A newly established
Commissariat
for State Control was given supervisory
authority over the
Council of People's Commissars where
Molotov was chairman,
and a deputy commissar of Foreign
Affairs was appointed
beside him in the person of Andrey Vyshinskiy.
Later Stalin
himself became the chairman of the Council
of People's

m

Commissars, replacing Molotov36

.

At the same time Malenkov and Beriya, who
were junior

leaders at that time, were promoted to the rank
of candidate
members of the Politburo in 1941. In order to
undermine

Zhdanov's reputation with Stalin, they laid the
groundwork
for his transfer to the doomed city of Leningrad.
This was
the nadir of Zhdanov's career,

since even the abandonment of

the city was contemplated during the three-year- long
siege.
34

Conquest (1991), pp. 105-141.
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It is worthwhile to note
that Leningrad always saw
Moscow as

p ovincial city. Leningrad was the
imperial capital,

a

revolutionary center in 1825,
1905, and twice in 1917, and
its party bosses had the habit
of challenging Stalin's
leadership, like Zinoviev in
1927, Kirov in 1934, or Zhdanov
in 19 4 6 37

.

During the war the role of the
Politburo was de facto
taken over by a special body, the
State Defense Committee.
The rivals' positions were well
reflected in the composition
of that body,

since Malenkov and Beriya, junior
leaders who
were only candidate members of the Politburo,
were included,
while Zhdanov, who had been an influential
senior

politician, was excluded despite his Politburo
membership 38
By 1944 Zhdanov was again on the ascendancy
after the

.

heroic defense of Leningrad, but since Malenkov's
star was
still high he was appointed chairman of the
Committee for
the Rehabilitation of the Liberated Areas and
Zhdanov's

comeback had to wait. In the fall of 1944 he was moved
to
Helsinki to supervise Finland's compliance with the terms
of
the armistice, and he could play no role in the leadership
for several months 39

.

Strangely enough, suddenly he was

relieved as first secretary of the Leningrad party

37
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organization and was elevated to
Moscow exactly when a great
celebration was held in Leningrad
in the honor of the "Hero
City". He was followed as
Leningrad first secretary by his
protege, A. Kuznetsov40
.

2.1.3

The Main Issues of Soviet Domestic
Politics Following
the War

As it has been pointed out earlier,
the war brought about

an earthquake in the traditional
patterns of Soviet life and
power relations. The importance and influence
of the party
diminished, whereas the role of the army, the
secret police,
the industry and the industrial management
significantly

increased. Stalin was well aware of this serious
change and
did not hesitate to act to restore the party to the
role it
"deserved"

.

To achieve his aim he primarily relied on the

assistance of the Zhdanov group.

Naturally it was the army that gained the greatest
prestige from the victory over the Nazis. In order to tackle
the popularity of the army, Stalin and the party revivalists
in their public speeches downgraded its role in the military

successes, and they emphasized that it was the Party,

Comrade Stalin, the great Russian people (or Soviet people,

depending on the personal predilections of the speaker)
40

Dunmore, pp. 15-17., 27.;McCagg, pp. 86-96.
38

,

and

only last the army that won the
war. Marshal Zhukov, the
main war hero, lost his influence
and was sent to a remote
corner of the country,
February, 1946 the separate army
and navy commissariats were merged
under the Armed Service
Commissariat (later Ministry) led by
Stalin. There were six
deputy ministers appointed, five of
whom were professional

m

soldiers, but the sixth, N. Bulganin,
who was not a soldier,
became the political general in charge
of general questions
and practically had authority over
the others 41
.

During the war the NKVD gained extremely
great power. It
had authority over the frontier guard,
as well, and in
certain regions with the help of the GULAG
administered vast
territories. It also commanded immense economic
capacities.

Stalin had been suspicious about the extraordinarily
powerful secret police for a long time. Already
back in 1941
the economic and security functions of the NKVD
were
separated, but this did not limit Beriya's influence

significantly and he also became a member of the State
Defense Committee. When converting war industries into

peacetime duties, this empire was shaken and in 1946 Beriya
was removed from the direct supervision of the NKVD (MVD)

Although he became full member of the Politburo he was not
given a position in the executive organs of the Party42

41

Hahn, p. 40.
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.

A third branch that had to be
overshadowed was the
industry managers. Between 1941 and

1945 the vast industrial

capacities were all placed into the
service of the war
effort. Traditional administrative
and regulatory processes
were ignored and the industrial
management became more
influential at the expense of the party.
The successful
performance of the industry during the war
further improved
its position. The leading figure of
the industrial
"lobby"

was Malenkov who was also in charge of
the cadre selection
and was the member of the State Defense
Committee. As has

been mentioned, in 1944 he became the chairman
of the
committee directing the economic rehabilitation of

the

liberated areas. After the conclusion of the war the
large
scale demobilization, the transition to peacetime
production
and political routines largely affected him and his
power
basis.

In September,

1945 the State Defense Committee was

abolished, and Malenkov had to surrender his post as deputy

chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 43

.

In the spring of 1946 all top governmental organs were

reorganized, Malenkov and Beriya became members of the
Pol i tburo

,

but at the same time Kuznetsov, the Leningrad

first secretary and Popov, another Zhdanovite, secretary of
the Moscow committee, were elevated to the Secretariat 44

.

Malenkov was absent from the list of the deputy chairmen of
43
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the Council of Ministers,
as well. Since even the
Politburo
proved to be too broad an organ
for Stalin, he separated a
group of six for directing foreign
policy (Politburo
Committee for Foreign Affairs)
which was supplemented in

October,

1946 by Voznesenskii as member
in charge of
economic issues, this way transforming
the "septet" into a

universal body 45

.

Zhdanov participated in the party
revivalist process
initiated by Stalin from the beginning.
After he gave up his
position in Leningrad he became the chairman
of the

Committee for Foreign Affairs of the
Supreme Soviet and was
direct charge of Soviet relations with the
foreign
46
Communist parties
In this period Stalin relied on

m

.

Zhdanov's influence in carrying out his policies
against the
army,

the police, and the industrial management,
but he had

no intention of letting Zhdanov slip out of
his fingers. The

reason why this almost happened was partly his poor
health

during 1945 and 1946. The Generalissimo had two heart
attacks prior to and during the Potsdam Conference according
to President Truman 47

.

He spent most of the cold seasons at

the Black Sea resorts, and was absent even from the November
7

parades in 1945 and 1946. Zhdanov managed to convince

Stalin that Malenkov's activity at the cadre selection and
45
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in other areas in the Central
Committee apparat had been
wrong (although as we have seen
Stalin did not really have
to be convinced)
Zhdanov and Voznesenskii wanted
to stop
the dismantling of German industries,
the main task of the
.

Malenkov committee for the rehabilitation
of the liberated
areas, so they led a campaign to
investigate the operation
of the committee, which proved
to be successful 48 The
.

dismantling was terminated, Malenkov
was suspended as
Central Committee secretary and cadres
chief, and replaced
by another Zhdanov ally, Patolichev
from the Chelyabinsk
49
organization
.

The 1946 celebration of the Revolution
was the climax of
Zhdanov's power. It was not only Stalin who was
missing from
the balcony of the Lenin Mausoleum, but
also Malenkov,
Beriya, Molotov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Voroshilov,

that is

all those who were not strongly related to Zhdanov.
However,

present were Zhdanov, Voznesenskii, Kuznetsov, Popov,
Patolichev, and several others from Zhdanov's immediate
circle. Even the ceremonial speech was delivered by

Zhdanov50

.

As is clear from these episodes, the most powerful leader

beside Stalin in the first two postwar years was Andrei
Zhdanov. In the next section we will explore what foreign
48
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policy line the Soviet Union
followed during the
" Zhdanovshchina"
as the period of Zhdanov's
predominance is
often referred to.
,

2.1.4

The General Approach towards Foreign
Policy,

1945

1946

As far as the foreign policy approaches
of the individual

leading personalities are concerned we
can rely upon the
series of speeches delivered in February,
1946 before the
elections to the Supreme Soviet. These speeches
are usually
and rightly regarded in the West as overtures
of the Cold
War, since they signalled for the first time
an unmistakable
shift in the official Soviet attitude. None of
the Politburo

members wanted to maintain the Grand Alliance and
continue
the East-West cooperation unaltered. All of them shared
the

same militant Marxist - Leninist ideological heritage and

never for a single minute had broken with their basic
hostile stance. However, there were significant differences
among the leaders concerning the extent of their hostility,
and these differences can be detected in the speeches.
The speeches of Zhdanov, Molotov, Malenkov, Beriya, and

Stalin and as well as Voznesenskii

'

s

announcement a few

weeks later about the new five-year plan show that Zhdanov,
Molotov, Voznesenskii, and Stalin were remarkably less
43

hostile toward the West than Malenkov
and Beriya. The
speeches were published in the Pravda
in the following
order: Beriya (February 6)
emphasized the threat

of a new

imperialist war the main target of
which would be the Soviet
Union, and called for the strengthening
of the militaryeconomic might of the country; Molotov
(February 7) although
underscoring international danger, viewed
the world as

divided horizontally, and not vertically;
Zhdanov (February
8) urged the reorientation of the
economy to peacetime
production, did not mention international
tension or the

possibility of a renewed armed conflict, and did
not
identify imperialists with nations; Malenkov

(also on

February

8)

ignored the prospects for peaceful development,

and focused on the necessity of concentrating on
the

military strength and heavy industry, and he laid more
emphasis on geographically defined blocs than Zhdanov.

Stalin (February

10)

was more in line with Zhdanov's

remarks, like Voznesenskiy (March 16) who indicated that the

gap between the heavy and light industry would not be so
great as in regular five-year plans, although he wanted to

achieve this with voluntarist methods: he wanted to push

both heavy industry and consumer production, with regard
almost exclusively to needs as opposed to the capacities of
the economy 51

51

.

Pravda articles of respective days.
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The two basic approaches
towards foreign policy in
postwar Soviet politics, like in
most countries, were
isolationism and participationism.
As Stalin indicated to

American Ambassador in Moscow Averell
Harriman in October,
1945 at the Gagry resort, there
was a strong

isolationist
wing present at the top level,
but he himself opposed it.
Malenkov and Beriya, who were the
main advocates of this
stance underscored military danger.
They were closely
connected with the industrial leadership
that had no
interest
getting involved in the affairs of the

m

imperialists
The participation! st line was represented
by Stalin,
Zhdanov, and Molotov, partly because of
the offices they
held. Molotov in his speeches on November

February,

6,

1945 and

1946 supported the reliance on the United
Nations,

and called for an "anti -blocist " continuation
of the Grand
Alliance. He argued that the supposedly divided
West could
be forced by diplomatic maneuvers to comply with
the Soviet
wishes. Zhdanov also did not consider some cooperation

impossible, since, as it had been pointed out, he was

talking about horizontal divisions, conflicts not between
nations, but between imperialist "elements" and "the

people". In his November

7,

1946 speech he was less

optimistic, but claimed that forces working for peace were

becoming stronger and stronger. Stalin backed the
part icipat ionis ts

,

because isolationism was advocated mostly
45

by representatives of the
industrial "lobby" and the
Malenkov- Beriya group he wanted
to do away with anyway, in
his interviews he was almost
always optimistic about the
peaceful developments, avoided
mentioning the prospects of
war, and occasionally promised
improvement in living
conditions in the country 52
.

Stalin always remained more cautious
in foreign policy
questions, he did not support adventurist
lines. He made
gestures toward the West after Hitler's
attack, eliminated
the Comintern in 1943 and did not
revive it until 1947, and
adopted a Soviet anthem instead of the
Internationale
that

explicitly called the international proletariat
for
struggle. Overall, he preferred salami tactics
to direct
confrontation. He considered the spirit of Yalta
and Potsdam
cooperative and not antagonistic. He agreed to the
establishment of the United Nations, but in return for
these
concessions he expected to have the only say in Eastern
Europe. Even in his reply to Churchill's Fulton speech
in
March,

1946 where he compared urging of the cooperation of

the English speaking countries to Hitler's ideas about the

superiority of the German people, he made a clear

distinction between Churchill and the current British
government, and he minimized the perception of threat by

52

McCagg, pp. 159-167.
46

claiming that Churchill and his
allies would not succeed in
organizing a military expedition
against Eastern Europe 53
Stalin publicly downgraded the
significance of the atomic
.

bomb. At Potsdam he reacted
indifferently to President
Truman's hint about the existence of
an extraordinarily

powerful weapon, news which seemingly
did not take him by
surprise 54 In subsequent interviews, as
for instance with
Elliot Roosevelt, he never mentioned the
55
nuclear
.

threat

.

Before 1949 there was not a single article
published in the
military press about atomic energy, in his
answers to the

written questions submitted by the London Sunday
Times staff
member Alexander Werth, he claimed that danger
of a new war
did not at that time exist. He said he did believe
in

friendly Soviet -Western relations, but not in the
atomic
bomb. He thought that the monopoly could not last
for long,

and the use of the A-bomb would be prohibited. However,

behind the scenes there was an intense concentration of
resources on nuclear experiments and a breathless struggle
to break the American monopoly. Stalin in private never

denied that the A-bomb was a dangerous weapon and a useful

bargaining tool.

"That is a powerful thing. Pow-er-ful!"
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-

as he once said in one of his
emotional outbursts 56 Since
he expected war sooner or later
(within fifteen or twenty
years), he regarded the imbalance
of power as a serious
.

political disadvantage and felt impelled
to overcome this
period of vulnerability as swiftly as
possible. Naturally,
he rejected the Baruch Plan that
would have kept the nuclear

secret

m

American hands for three more years, and
he used
the peace movement in Western Europe
to evoke an anti-

American and anti -atom atmosphere.
The dismantling of the East German industries,
that is
leaving as little as possible for the West
Germans in case
of a unification also fitted in the picture
as long as the

future of the country was unclear 57

.

The application of a

militant line within the Cominform was also a useful
method
of keeping the Western governments under the threat
of mass

revolt at home. In a letter to Professor Razin of the Frunze

Military Academy, who had brought up the possibility of the
adaptation of a more offensive military doctrine, Stalin
wrote that once the Soviet Union tested his own atomic
weapon,

it will be in a good position to assert itself.

until then it would be silly to provoke the West 58

But

.

As a short conclusion of the events of 1945-1946 we can

state that these two years witnessed the gradual
56
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deterioration of the relationship
between the Western
democracies and the Soviet Union.
As it has been pointed out
above, there was a consensus among
the
top Soviet leaders

concerning the untenability of the
Grand Alliance. However,
continuous communication between East
and West was
maintained, in large part due to the
predominance of
part lcipat lonist forces in the leadership.
Simultaneously,
the wartime and postwar agreements
were interpreted

differently on the two sides of the Iron
Curtain. For the
Soviet Union the Western endorsement of
its need for
friendly governments along its borders meant
that it was

only the Soviet Union whose interest were
to be taken into
consideration in that part of the world. They assumed
that

the sacrifice of millions Russians had created
a legitimate

basis for them to exclude Western influence and
establish
regimes following the Soviet pattern.

2.1.5

A New Approach towards Foreign Policy, 1947-1948

The communi zat ion of Eastern Europe was achieved through

distinct stages. Seton Watson, for instance, distinguishes
three stages through which Stalinist regimes came to life 59

.

In the first stage there were mostly genuine coalitions

between traditional bourgeois parties and the Communists as
59
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a result of elections or
agreements among the different

political forces. Later, in the "bogus
coalition" stage,
when the Communist parties gained
substantial strength and
the cooperation among the parties
proved to be a nuisance
for them they ousted the bourgeois
parties from
the

governments or the parliaments, and merged with
the Social
Democratic Parties. In the final stage, in which
the

monolithic, Stalinist regimes were created, the
non-

communist political parties were either outlawed
or stripped
9-11

facilities for exerting influence on politics,

Communists who were not educated in Stalin's court were

prosecuted and expelled or executed, and the whole
P°l^-tical -economic structure of the country was transformed

following the Soviet pattern.
The years 1945 and 1946 passed in the spirit of genuine

coalitions in Eastern Europe and of the predominance of the

Zhdanov group and the party revivalists in Soviet domestic
politics. As we have pointed out, Zhdanov favored a relative

moderation concerning foreign relations and his
preponderance in the Politburo and the tentative endorsement
of his line by Stalin had an impact on Soviet foreign

policy
However,

the party revival became too successful and the

Zhdanov group became too powerful for Stalin by early 1947.
The November

7,

1946 parade had a powerful psychological

impact on Stalin. He realized that allowing a faction to
50

gain such strength could endanger
his own power.
Simultaneously, the East European Communist
leaders were no
longer satisfied with their situation
where they had to seek
consensus all the time with the bourgeois
elements in the
governments and were eager to take advantage
of the

closeness of the Red Army and the Soviet
predominance in the
Allied Control Commissions. By mid- 1947 Stalin
had

ascertained that the West, and especially the United
States
had ultimately changed the policies of President
Roosevelt
and no longer would make concessions in order to
maintain a
safe world order. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan
were clear signs of the shift 60

.

Zhdanov also perceived the nature of these developments.
He realized that unless he adopted a much more militant

strategy he would lose the support of both Stalin and the
foreign Communists he had built up while being the chairman
of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee.

In close

cooperation with the Yugoslavs he organized the revival of
the Comintern, whereas his ally, Voznesenskii set forth an

offensive program for the further development of the heavy

industry and launched an attack on the most prominent Soviet
economist, Yevgenii Varga.

The establishment of the Cominform was the direct

consequence of foreign and Soviet internal developments.

Different tactics had to be adopted by both the Zhdanov
60
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group and the East European Communists.
The start of the
deterioration of Zhdanov's position is
reflected by
Malenkov's inclusion in the Soviet delegation
to the

founding meeting of the Cominform, but it
was still Zhdanov
who was in the center. Malenkov presented
only a minor
report that discussed the Soviet decrees on
literature,
culture, and philosophy, that is the significant

achievements of the Zhdanovshchina

.

Malenkov also had to

denounce Aleksandrov, one-time follower of Zhdanov,
who had
switched sides and had gone over to Malenkov. There were
no

Asian parties invited which can be explained by the fact
that Malenkov had been working in the Commission for
the Far

East of the Politburo, and Zhdanov probably wanted to keep

Malenkov's clients out of the negotiations. In addition, the
Chinese were looked upon suspiciously at the time since

Stalin had not authorized Mao's military offensive 61

.

Zhdanov developed the two- camp theory and dropped his
idea about the horizontal division in the world. It can be

supposed that this change was necessary for him not to
isolate himself within the Soviet leadership. He admonished
the Western Communist parties that their collaborative

tactics had been wrong and called on them to revise their

policies from the top to the bottom. However, it needs to be

emphasized that Zhdanov intended to give a certain scope of
initiative to local party leaders, and he meant the
61
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Cominform as an informative propaganda
organization, rather
62
than a tool for control
.

The result of these policies were
exactly the opposite of
what had been planned. The strikes
that broke out in France
and Italy were unsuccessful and ultimately
undermined the
respect of the Communists. Zhdanov's designs
to allow a
scope of initiative for the local leaders
only fuelled

msurrectionism throughout Eastern Europe. Stalin was
caught
between Western pressures and those of the
insurrectionists,
and he was compelled to find a way out. Malenkov,
who
had

regarded the Cominform as a tool for imposing uniformity
in
Eastern Europe, and Beriya, who had the "adequate"
means for

regulating the naughty, offered a solution: to promote
them
on the expense of Zhdanov's authority while uniformizing
and

Stalinizing the satellite states 63

.

In addition to the founding of the Cominform,

the Varga

represented an episode of great significance among
the events of 1947, and was an indication of a tangible

shift in the domestic balance of power. Yevgenii Varga, who
was the director of the Institute of World Economics and

World Politics published his major book "Changes in the
Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War"
in 1946.

In this book he argued that capitalist governments

during the war had acquired great power over their economies
62
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through planning to concentrate
the resources on the war
effort. The capitalist states
retained the ability to plan
after the war which enabled them
to cope more effectively
with economic crises. The difference
between the capitalist
and socialist countries had diminished
and they became
less

objectionable for each other. Varga considered
revolutions
abroad less likely and less necessary.
Varga's ideas were unchallenged during
1946 and most of
1947. Moreover, they were mostly given
a warm

welcome. But

by the end of 1947 the voice of the critics
had become

amplified by the above outlined developments.
Voznesenskii
already a Politburo member, attacked Varga publicly

in his

book "The Wartime Economy of the USSR During the
Great
Patriotic War", published in December, 1947. Zhdanov's
son,
Yurii as head of the Agitprop's Science Section was

responsible for the field of economic science, and in this
capacity he presumably sanctioned the attacks.

Voznesenskii in his book claimed that the Capitalist
economies had been severely devastated, whereas the Soviet

economy had been left practically intact by the war. The
talk about planning in the West is merely a wish, since the

state had played no decisive role in the war economies of
capitalism. According to Voznesenskii, it was still the

monopolies that controlled the capitalist economic policies,
consequently, the transition from war to peacetime

production would produce crises and mass unemployment.
54

After Voznesenskii had started the
attack, Varga came
under severe criticism from all
directions,

but he was not

executed, never arrested, and practically
was not affected
by the entire hysteria measured by
contemporary Soviet

standards 64

.

Stalin presumably shared some of Varga's
basic ideas,
which can be inferred beside the outcome
of Varga's fate
from Stalin's interview with the Republican
Presidential
aspirant Harold Stassen in April, 1947. in that
conversation
Stalin played the role of the interviewer and
elicited
responses from Stassen concerning the prospects of
the

American economy that supported the essence of Varga's
ideas, namely that state regulation of the capitalist

economy was feasible. In May, 1947 after the text of the

interview had been published in the United States, Pravda

accused the American press of altering Stalin's words. Later
the Moscow radio claimed that Stalin did not use the word

"regulation" and the actual word was "control". These words

were exactly the pivotal elements of the Varga debate. Two

and a half years later Malenkov quoted Stalin's words from
the document published in the United States and he used the

expression "regulation", removing all doubts about its
authenticity, and giving an expected answer to the
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speculations about who had been behind
the changing of the
65
text
.

It was not accidental that the
fall of Zhdanov and the

expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform
took place at the
same time. The Soviet -Yugoslav rift
had interf actional
aspects within Moscow, since Stalin was
not pleased with
Zhdanov's attempts to create a power base
abroad through the
Cominform organization. Stalin in January,
1948 summoned
Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations into the
Kremlin and
invited Malenkov and M. Suslov, who later
denounced

Voznesenskii, to the discussions. The topic of the
meeting
was to be the Balkan Federation the Yugoslavs
and
the

Bulgarians were working on. Despite the fact that the
plan
had previously been endorsed by Molotov, Stalin at the

meeting came up with serious objections. In fact he did not
oppose the idea of federations, and he even proposed that

similar federations should be established between Poland and
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, as well as between
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. It is more likely that

Stalin used the question of federations only as a pretext to

bring things to a head and break up Zhdanov'

s

Balkan cobweb

which was threatening to gain a state - organizational form

beyond being an ideological bloc. During the Moscow talks, a
few members of the Yugoslav delegation made a trip to
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Leningrad that ultimately infuriated
Stalin, since the
Leningrad party organization was one
of Zhdanov's most
important strongholds. He warned the
Yugoslav leaders in a
letter written in May, 1948 that if
Tito meddled into the
Soviet factional struggles, he would
have no basis to object
if Stalin sent his own agents to
Belgrade 66
.

By that time Zhdanov was no longer in
a position to save
the Yugoslavs. During the second Cominform
meeting
in June,

1948, where the Soviet delegation included
Malenkov and

Suslov beside Zhdanov, a resolution was passed
condemning
Yugoslavs for pursuing an anti-Soviet foreign policy.
The

decision was published under the name of Zhdanov,
which was
a humiliation similar to that of Bukharin who
had been
forced to denounce his "Rightist" associates two decades
earlier. Malenkov had done the same with Aleksandrov at
the

founding meeting of the Cominform67

.

Shortly after the Cominform meeting Zhdanov died,

probably under natural circumstances, and it was again

Malenkov and Beriya, as during the war, who gained the upper
hand in the factional debates. The finale of the first four

postwar years of Soviet internal politics was the Leningrad
Affair, apparently staged against Zhdanov's followers whose

cradle and center was Leningrad, the revolutionary city.

After Suslov became a member in the Secretariat, and
66
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Malenkov also managed to regain his membership,
they with
the help of Beriya "succeeded" in
revealing a plot

emanating

m

Leningrad. The charges were so secret that
even Politburo
members did not know about them. It was only
after

Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party
Congress
in 1956 that some information leaked out
about the case.
There are Western sources that refer to certain
Soviet

observers who claim that the Zhdanov group was attempting
to
create a separate party organization for the Russian

Federation centered in Leningrad 68

.

The main victims of the

purge were Voznesenskiy and Kuznetsov who were shot in 1950
along with several other secondary characters of the
story 69

.

MtaTonkov and Beriya placed the final gloss on the profile
of the Cominform that resembled in almost every respect its

predecessor. By 1949 thoroughly uniformized Stalinist
regimes were established and the remnants of political

freedom were rooted out completely. The showtrials to
eliminate insurrectionist local leaders who were not willing
to give up the right for individual initiative followed the

Soviet pattern of the thirties and were coordinated by

Beriya's secret police connections. The economies of the

satellite countries were transformed along the lines of

five-year plans outlawing private ownership and enterprise.
68
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In 1949 the Council of Mutual
Economic Aid was established
to isolate the Eastern European

economies from Western

capitalist influence and to provide an
organization to keep
them under control.

2.2

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the
United
States,

2.2.1

1945-1948

American Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 19451946

The United States emerged from World War II as the

preponderant country in the world. Warfare had taken place
outside the American Continent, thereby the infrastructure

remained undamaged. However, the United States, as member of
the Grand Alliance established an immense standing army and

transformed its powerful economy to concentrate on the war
effort. While these changes had been indispensable for the

victory,

the disarmament and the transition to peacetime

routines created a series of tensions that affected the

political affairs of the first postwar years. Despite the

large-scale demobilization the American military was

considered the strongest because of its long-range air
force,

sizeable navy, and most importantly, its nuclear

monopoly. These factors created a tangible sense of security

59

and predominance within the American
leadership in the
immediate postwar months 70
.

On April 12,

1945 shortly after having taken the
oath,

the new President, Harry S. Truman
expressed to his Cabinet
members that he intended to continue the
late Franklin

Roosevelt's policies, but also made it clear
that he would
be President in his own right. Although
before he became
Vice President he had been working in the
Senate
for ten

years and maintained a broad set of connections
in the
legislative body and among the close colleagues of
Roosevelt, some of his new advisors had uneasy
feelings

concerning Truman as President. Admiral Leahy was
afraid
that for a man so "completely inexperienced in
international

affairs" certain difficult issues might prove insoluble,
and

even General Marshall said that "only time could tell what
he was really like" 71

.

However, Truman was not absolutely

ignorant about the situation of his country. As a Senator he
was the chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the

National Defense Program whose creation he proposed, and
while coordinating its operation he got to

everything about the American war effort 72

know almost

.

Besides, he had spent most of his youth reading books on

history after he had been prescribed strong glasses which
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had prevented him from participating in
the dangerous games
of kids of his age 73 He still vividly
remembered
.

the

failure of the League of Nations to stop the
Japanese in
Manchuria, the Italians in Ethiopia, the Germans
in the

Rhineland or Czechoslovakia, and the Spanish Civil
War, and
concluded that all these debacles had originated
in the

United States' refusal to join the League. He often
recalled
that after 1933 isolationism was furthered by both
the

Democrats and the Republicans, and that position was

abandoned only after the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Truman
also felt the need for an adequate preparedness for defense,

because he viewed that democracy had to be ready to defend
itself against dictatorship. In relation to the Russians he

had for long espoused a rather strong anti - Communist stance,

and remained throughout the war of the opinion that the
Soviet Union was a difficult wartime ally and would be a

"troublesome peacetime partner". He considered upholding of
the Yalta agreements and turning back the tide of

isolationism in America his cardinal foreign policy task 74

.

One of Truman's first and most important decisions was
the appointment of James Byrnes Secretary of State. Byrnes

had been Senator between 1931 and 1941 when he was proposed
by Roosevelt to the Supreme Court, but shortly after that as
the United States entered the war the President asked him to
73
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give up his lifetime position and
become the leader of the
Office of Economic Stabilization. In
1943 he was elevated
even higher, and became the chairman of
the Office of War
Mobilization which meant, according to many
observers

that

Byrnes was the "Assistant President" in charge
of domestic
affairs. One of the most important episodes
that strongly
affected his relationship with the new President
had been
Roosevelt's decision to nominate Truman for the Vice

Presidency instead of Byrnes. Now that Truman became
President he clearly wanted to make that affair up to
Byrnes
and appointed him Secretary of State who was to succeed
him
as President in case he died (since the elected President

was not alive)

.

But Byrnes probably never forgot that

actually he could have been President at the moment and not
Truman 75

.

Byrnes was considered an expert on the Yalta Conference,

mainly because no official minutes about the secret
conversations existed. Truman asked Byrnes to transcribe the

shorthand notes he had made during the Conference and share
it with him,

which happened on April 23, 1945. During their

conversation that day since both of them were already in

possession of the atomic secret, Byrnes was of the opinion
that the circumstances would enable the United States to

dictate its own terms.
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April 23 was also the day of a
significant meeting of
Truman with his top military advisors
and with Molotov who
arrived to participate in the San Francisco
Conference.
According to Admiral Leahy there was a
consensus of opinions
among the advisors that the United States
should take a firm
stand in affairs concerning the Soviet Union 76
However,
.

two

of the participants warned about the
possible consequences
of such policies.

Secretary Stimson, who favored the

balance- of -power approach to world politics and
considered
the acceptance of spheres of influence a way to
avoid

collision with the Soviets, called for cautiousness, and

proposed that the settlement of territorial acquisitions and
the question of the influence the great powers could exert
in Eastern Europe must precede the establishment of the

United Nations 77

.

General Marshall also advised Truman to

exercise more caution, because the Soviets might delay entry
into the Pacific war until the United States had carried out
the dirty work 78

.

Stalin's decision to refuse to send Molotov to the San

Francisco Conference as a response to Western objections
about his policies in Poland also pushed Truman toward a

stiffer stance. Ambassador Harriman, to resolve the
conflict, suggested to Stalin that Molotov's participation
76
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would be a step in the right direction.
He even offered a
special plane to get the Soviet Foreign
Minister to San
Francisco. The Generalissimo finally
gave in. Beside
Harriman' s efforts it is likely that
Stalin was more than
curious about the new President and wanted
to get first hand
information about him. If that was his intention
he
got it.

Already in possession of a full knowledge about
the atomic
experiments and after meeting with Harriman where

they had

agreed that it had been time to "make it plain
to the Soviet
government" that the United States would not forever
allow
the Soviet Union to do anything it wanted, Truman
talked
to

Molotov in a language that shocked even Charles Bohlen,
his
interpreter, who was otherwise pleased by this bluntness.
But it was not only Harriman who convinced Truman about
the

necessity of a firm stance 79

.

Bernard Baruch in his report

to the President believed that the Soviet Union could be

handled if "we kept our promises and insisted that Russia do
the same, and if we had a concise grasp of our policy". A

friendly firmness, a strict control of Germany, a new peace

making machinery, and aid to Britain would result in a
stable and acceptable world order 80

.

President Truman kept this advice especially in relation
to the United Nations, but in this area he cooperated with

another character who did not make it easier for his pro79
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Soviet sentiments, if there were any,
to come into the
foreground. Prime Minister Churchill
proposed that the
Western allies should retain the occupied
territories
together with Berlin, Prague and Vienna
to gain a more
advantageous position during the subsequent
negotiations,
but Truman asked how could America expect
Stalin observe the
agreements if itself broke them. Nevertheless,
Churchill's
remarks probably helped Truman at the San
Francisco

Conference to refuse to yield to the Soviet demands,
because
he remembered the failure of the League of
Nations and knew
that an effective Charter was indispensable.
Churchill also
wanted an early Big-Three meeting to negotiate from a more
favorable position, but Truman decided on postponement.
There were several domestic questions and budgetary problems
to be solved, he had a new Secretary of State, but most

importantly he wanted to give those working on the atomic
bomb more time so that he could negotiate in possession of
the good news 81

.

Although within the highest circles the new approach
toward the Soviets was already being formulated, the

American public, which is an important component to be taken
into account during policy formulation, was still so

friendly to the Russians that they did not even want to hear
about accusations. During the 1945 Congressional debates

only a few Congressmen warned against a Soviet danger, and
81
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Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes sa
id that those who
claimed that the Soviet Union was
dangerous were the same
who had not expected Hitler to attack
us. According to
General Eisenhower cooperation with the
Russians was
possible, and greater contact would lead
to greater
understanding 82
.

Truman himself also did not want to take a
hostile stance
until he was sure that the Soviets did not want
to
cooperate, but also wanted to retain the support
of Britain.

Therefore he decided to dispatch missions to Stalin
and
Churchill as a preparation for the Potsdam Conference
and as

reassurance that he advocated cooperation. Harry Hopkins,

Roosevelt's all-purpose troubleshooter and Joseph Davies,
former Ambassador to Moscow were both pro-Russian and anti-

colonialist diplomats and a right choice to carry out the

President's intentions.
Hopkins was always optimistic about the policies of the
Russians, and considered that everything should be done to

promote the Big-Three cooperation. As Charles Bohlen noted,
no one tried harder to preserve the wartime alliance.

Hopkins had a mild, but successful negotiation with Stalin.

They came to an agreement on the Polish issue, Stalin

accepted the right for a free debate in the General Assembly
of the United Nations and again promised a Soviet entry into

the Pacific war. Hopkins also explained to Stalin that the
82
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abrupt termination of the Lend-Lease was
only a procedural
mistake. However, Harriman felt that Stalin
would never
"fully understand our interest in a free
Poland as a matter
of principle" 83
.

Davies interpreted Truman's views to Churchill,
namely
that the world situation was dangerous due to
the

disagreements concerning the Yalta provisions. Churchill

warned that a "steel curtain" was being built between
Eastern and Western Europe, and because of this the United
States should keep its forces on the Old Continent and

retain the currently occupied territories. He also signalled
that in case America failed to do so, Britain still had

superior air power and it was still difficult to cross the
Channel. Davies reiterated Truman's intention to carry out
the Yalta agreement and expressed his shock at Britain's

attitude toward the Soviet Union 84

.

However, after the Postdam Conference, where Truman was

informed about the successful explosion of the atomic bomb

which made him boss the whole meeting, as Churchill
observed, the President had a much clearer picture about the

Soviet ambitions 85

.

He ultimately concluded that the Soviets

were aiming to expand not only in Europe, but also toward
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the Middle East and North Africa,
but he also thought that a
great deal of it was only a bluff 86
.

Stalin maintained his promise to declare
war on Japan,
which was still considered necessary.
On June 18 General
Marshall advised the President that a
Soviet entry would be
a "decisive action levering them
(Japan) into capitulation".
Admiral King was hesitant whether it was
really
necessary,

but the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 21
repeatedly

advocated the Russian participation. Marshall
said if
America fought alone nothing would prevent the

Soviet Union

from marching right into Manchuria and taking
whatever they
wanted. During the Potsdam Conference on July 29
Molotov

proposed that the United States should publicly invite
the
Soviet Union to enter, which, naturally, was immediately
rejected by Truman 87

.

Nonetheless, the Soviets declared war on Japan as
scheduled, and after the two nuclear attacks the Japanese

surrendered a year earlier than it had been expected in
April

During the immediate postwar months there was a
continuous communication between the members of the former

Grand Alliance. The scene of these negotiations was the
Council of Foreign Ministers established at Potsdam, but
86
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Which proved to be basically
futile apart from the
conclusion of the peace terms with
the former Nazi
satellites
Furthermore, the first two Foreign
ministers' Conferences
provided certain events which contributed
to Secretary
Byrnes's subsequent replacement. The
London Foreign
Ministers Conference in October, 1945
adjourned without any
result fundamentally because of Molotov's
intransigence, but
before all channels had been tried to
reach some compromise,
Byrnes, without consulting the President
or the members of
the delegation, persuaded the Chinese
Minister to declare
the conference ended. On their way home
from London Byrnes
indicated his uneasiness about his decision, but
this time
no consequences followed. Ambassador Harriman
visited Stalin
at the Black Sea after the futile Conference,
and they

succeeded in establishing some basis for compromise 88

.

Byrnes did not want to miss the opportunity to repair his

London mistake, and called for a Foreign Ministers Meeting
to Moscow, but against the advice of senior diplomats.

Prior

to his departure he briefed a number of Senators on his plan
to get Soviet approval to create an atomic energy commission

under the authority of the United Nations. The Senators felt
that Byrnes wanted to share information about nuclear

experiments with the Russians before establishing adequate
institutions for inspection. They asked the President about
88
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his intentions and Truman reassured
them that he would not
give out atomic secrets. He cabled
Byrnes not to do so, and
Byrnes cabled back that he agreed 89
.

The atmosphere of the December,
1945 Moscow Conference
was far from pleasant. Byrnes had
not suggested the

participation of the French to please Stalin,
and Bevin also
was sidetracked during most of the
discussions.
The whole

Conference was hastily improvized, thoroughly
disorganized,
and items were put on the agenda without
proper preparation.
Byrnes ran much of the negotiations from his
own head.
Furthermore, the Secretary was not sending back
regular

reports to the President as had been the case in
other
conferences. When Bohlen, his aide and interpreter
asked
why,

Byrnes replied sharply that he knew when to report.

That time his performance had serious consequences.
The

press declared the Moscow Conference an "eastern Munich" and
Byrnes a new Chamberlain, because he agreed to a partial

broadening of the Bulgarian and Rumanian governments, which
was a retreat from the Yalta agreements 90

.

However, his main critic was the President himself. He

was infuriated because of Byrnes's one-man show, and because
he ignored Ambassador Harriman. According to Harriman and

Samuel Rosenmann, counsel to the President, Byrnes behaved

independently because he was jealous of Truman and he
89

Truman (vol. 1), pp. 547-548.

90

Druks, p.

89

70

thought that Truman had stolen the
Presidency from him.
Leahy reported that Truman was angry
because Byrnes had not
consulted with him about the Moscow
agreements, and the
Secretary was trying to lead the
American foreign policy in
a direction the President could
not accept 91 Byrnes's
personal style was to operate as a loner,
keeping matters
restricted to a small circle of advisers,
which method
inevitably conflicted with Truman's strong
views on the
.

prerogatives of the President. Besides, Byrnes
was
considerably senior to Truman in the Democratic

Party,

so he

might have felt that he was entitled to have
an independent
position. Truman wrote him a letter and read it
out to him
(he denies it) in which the President
expressed his

discontent about the Secretary's manner of conducting
policy. He reiterated that he opposed extending
recognition
to Bulgaria and Rumania unless the governments of
those

countries included all democratic elements. Truman felt
there would be war unless the Soviet Union was faced with

determined resistance. That was the time when Truman decided
to replace Byrnes with Marshall, as soon as the General

accomplished his mission in China 92

.

During 1945 and 1946 advisors of the President

continuously worked on assessing Soviet intentions and the

military power that would support the particular policies.
91
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According to one of the most characteristic
estimates set
forth by Rear Admiral Inglis, Chief of Naval
intelligence,
the Soviet land armies were powerful enough
to take over all
of Europe except the British Isles, the
Middle East, and

North Africa, but the they would not fight until
they had
reconstructed their economy and transportation, stockpiled
an atomic arsenal, and consolidated their position
in

Eastern Europe. As Inglis pointed out, there were more
than
ten million people in forced labor camps in the Soviet
Union, and much of the army was kept abroad because there

was not enough food and accommodation at home 93

George Kennan, Charge

d'

.

Affaires in Moscow also believed

that the Soviet union was bent upon disrupting the American

society and destroying the American international authority
to secure its power, but not by war. According to Harriman,

Russia would not provoke war if it realized that the United
States would not make endless concessions. But if not met

with a firm resistance and not contained at all fronts,

Communism would not hesitate to take over power in all of
Europe 94

.

These opinions were supported by the events of the

Iranian crisis. The State Department correctly assessed the

situation as different from that in Eastern Europe. In Iran
there was no pro- Soviet government on power that could have
93
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objected to the "meddling into their
internal affairs".
Furthermore, the Soviets were met
by a united opposition in
the UN Security Council and they
had no choice but to yield
on the issue”. Credit should
be given to Byrnes who had the
courage to throw the full support of
the United States
behind such a small country on the
border of the Soviet
96
Union
.

The Paris Peace Conference that took
place between July
and October, 1946 was the only negotiation
where the Soviet
and American delegations achieved genuine
results but also
it was during that conference when
one of the most peculiar
episodes of Truman's first Presidential term
happened.

Henry Wallace was a prominent representative
of the New
Deal, he had been Secretary of Agriculture and
later Vice

President for Roosevelt, and Truman retained him in
his
Cabinet as Secretary of Commerce. He had always opposed
the
firm stance toward Russia taken by the Truman

administration, but in 1945 he generally remained quiet in
his critiques. However, after the Fulton speech he thought

Churchill was taking advantage of Truman's hospitality and
was trying to force his own militancy on the President.

Wallace in a letter to the Mexican President wrote that
Churchill insulted Truman by trying to imply that the
95
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President's presence meant an endorsement
of the speech
which had conveyed that "intervention in
Europe was
advisable when Anglo-American forces were
strengthened", in
a letter to Truman on March 14, 1946
which was

not answered,

and in another one written in July, Wallace
warned the
President about the danger of a new war and called

on him to

share the nuclear secrets with the Russians and
to destroy
all atomic weapons. He believed relations could
be improved
by extending economic contacts 97
.

Truman answered in a cordial manner, but felt that

Wallace was willing to give in to the Soviets to achieve
better world situation. Finally, on September

12,

in a

speech in Madison Square Garden Wallace launched an all-out

attack on the administration's foreign policy. He criticized
Truman

"get-tough" policy and the military, claiming that

s

"only the United Nations should have atomic bombs and its

military establishment should give special emphasis to air
power.

It should have control of the strategically located

air bases with which the United States and Britain have

encircled the world" 98

.

According to Karl Schmidt Truman knew all about the
speech,

since Wallace had showed it to him and had read the

text out 99
97

.

Wallace in his diary recalled the encounter as
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follows:

"At the meeting with the President I went over
page

by page with him my Madison Square Garden speech to
be given
on September 12. Again and again he said, "That's right";
Yes,

that is what

I

believe." He did't have a single change

to suggest. He twice said how deeply he appreciated my

courtesy in showing him my speech before

I

gave it... The

President apparently saw no inconsistency between my speech
and what Byrnes was doingh

-

if he did,

in any way..." 100 Truman denied this,

he did't indicate it

saying that when they

met on September 10, they were talking about issues

unrelated to foreign policy, and Wallace mentioned his
planned speech only in the last part of the conversation
when there was no time left for him to read it even in
parts. He simply welcomed Wallace's intention to deliver a
speech. After the speech, Truman told reporters answering a

question that he had approved of the whole speech, but on
September 14 when tensions were going high he had to issue a
communique stating that he had been misunderstood and there
had been no change in the administration's foreign

policy 101

.

It is inconceivable that the President would have

endorsed the speech if he had carefully read

it,

but

Wallace's view could not be a surprise for him after the two
letters he had received.
100
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John Foster Dulles, the leading Republican
foreign policy
expert was disturbed by the incident, and
he wrote Senator
Taft that if the Russians perceived that
the United States
was divided it might increase chances of war.
According to
the Republican National Committee, Truman
"betrayed Mr.

Byrnes and was bidding for the support of the CIO
Political
Action Committee which favored appeasing the Russians
abroad
and promoting communism at home". Although Senator

Vandenberg reiterated that Republicans would continue to
support bi-partisan foreign policy, he indicated that they
could cooperate with only "one Secretary of State at a
time

.

Senator Connally, a leading Democrat on foreign

affairs insisted that in the present situation there was no
room for "partisan politics or intraparty division or

personal ambition". Meanwhile, Wallace released the letters
he had written to the President in March and July which made
it clear that Truman had been aware of his Secretary's

foreign policy views 102

.

The whole affair was especially awkward for the

administration because Byrnes was in the middle of the peace
negotiations that for the first time appeared to be
successful, and Bernard Baruch was working on the American

proposal on atomic energy to the United Nations. Byrnes

threatened to quit if Wallace's activity would be tolerated,
and the next day Wallace was fired. He was replaced by
102
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Aver ell Harriman as Secretary of Commerce which was
a clear
indication that Truman was not willing to modify his
stance 103

.

In concluding our treatment of the first two
postwar

years in American foreign policy formation we can point
out
that although Truman identified himself with most of

Roosevelt's policies, he was compelled to seek a new foreign

policy approach on the one hand by the changed international
situation, and by the largely uncompromising attitude of

most of his top advisors. He could no longer count on the

Russians as allies, but channels of communication and

cooperation were still maintained and used by both sides.
The Soviet Union was seen as an expansionist power with a
large military establishment, but also as one with serious

economic problems, and it was believed by taking a firm
stance the expansion could be contained.

2.2.2

Change in American Domestic Politics and Foreign
Policy,

1947-1948

Act II of Truman's first term started with the debacle of
the Democratic Party at the 1946 Congressional elections.

The President at the time seemed very weak, and chances for
his renomination were slight. The Republican gains meant a
103
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divided government for 1947-1948 and indicated
a Republican
victory for 1948. The Democrats were defeated
for several

reasons. After four years of war substantial
savings had

accumulated with the population because of the wartime
restraints, people were eager to buy commodities that
had

been scarce during the war, but there was a shortage
of

practically all goods. There were severe housing problems,
thousands of veterans were homeless. Furthermore, the 1946
removal of price control caused high inflation which

threatened the savings of the population.
The administration got into conflict with the traditional

supporters of the Democratic Party, as well. In 1946, 116

million man-days of work were lost due to strikes in the
auto and steel industries and at the railways. Truman took
an uncompromising stance with the strikers, which was judged
as a curtailment of basic freedoms even by politicians like

Senator Taft who was not famous for being fond of labor
organizations. The exodus of New Dealers from the Cabinet

and their replacement often with undistinguished friends of

Truman resulted in the disaffection of many liberals 104

.

The bloc of Southern Democrats and conservative

Republicans which had represented an opposition since the

Seventy Eighth Congress between 1944 and 1946 now gained
substantial strength.
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The Republicans after a negative campaign came
up with
their own legislative program based on tax reduction
and

drastic cut in federal spending, and with relatively
slight
emphasis on foreign policy. Senator Taft, the Republican
leader in his January

3,

1946 radio speech devoted only a

very short time to that area, predicting Congressional
resistance to large-scale foreign assistance and tariff
reductions, but favored the continuation of bi-partisanship

endorsed by senator Vandenberg 105

.

Taft's leadership did not extend to foreign policy
questions. A strategic "division of labor" existed between

him and Vandenberg, who expressed his confidence in Taft's
dominance in domestic issues, while Taft for this reason
shared his power with him. Vandenberg'

s

counterpart in the

House Foreign Affairs Committee was Charles Eaton who was

also supporter of internationalism and bi-partisanship and
who proved to be a key figure beside Vandenberg in creating
a smooth cooperation between the Congress and the

administration 106

.

In working out its own legislative agenda recovering

after the election defeat, the administration identified
itself with the report made by White House staff member

James Rowe, Jr. Rowe considered the clash between the

105
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President and the Congress inevitable,
for this reason he
recommended that Truman prepare his
proposals on legislation
in as general a manner as possible
and in a conciliatory

tone. According to Rowe the President
should insist on bi-

partisan cooperation and avoid emphasizing
differences
between programs of the administration and
the Congressional
107
maj ority
.

Prospects for a successful performance were not
favorable. There were heated intraparty debates
among
Democrats, and Truman did not enjoy much respect.
Senator

Fulbright proposed that the President appoint a
Republican

Secretary of State and then resign. Former Speaker of
the
House Sam Rayburn refused to be the minority leader, and
he

accepted the post only after strong White House pressures.
All this convinced Truman to set forth a moderate

legislative program 108

.

Meanwhile Henry Wallace got into the limelight. Although
throughout most of 1947 he denied that he intended to lead a
third party, during his visits abroad he continued his

attack on Truman and started to indicate that he would not
support him in 1948. The White house wanted to be very
careful with Wallace, since for a great number of voters he
was still associated with the New Deal, but it was also
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calculated that his sharp attacks might
alienate the voters
rather than winning a larger support 109
.

The first five months of the Congress
passed in a

conciliatory atmosphere mainly because of the
intraparty
conflicts of the GOP delayed the presentation
of the

controversial parts of their program on tax and
labor
legislation.

Tranquil relations between the President and the
Congress
during the first months of 1947 extended into the
area of

foreign affairs, as well. The appointment of General

Marshall to replace Byrnes as Secretary of State also was
a
factor that helped maintain bi-partisanship, and enjoying
the support of Vandenberg and Eaton.

The Greek-Turkish Aid,

the peace treaties with the former Nazi-allies, a relief aid
for Europe, and the National Security Act successfully went

through the Congressional procedures 110

.

Although most Republicans were firmly anti Communist and
-

politically internationalist, they were reluctant to spend
the money of the taxpayers abroad and were skeptical about
"free trade" in general. This was manifested in the

rejection of the original form of the reciprocal - trade
program, and the United States could join the GATT only

after the agreements of a series of special negotiations
109
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between the State Department and the Republicans had
been
included in an executive order 111
.

The tough times for Truman in the Congress came after

changes in the world policy trends necessitated a new
approach, which required Congressional authorization.

When Ambassador Smith asked Stalin "How far is Russia
going to go?", the Generalissimo replied "We're not going

much further" 112

.

Approximately that was the extent the

United States government was familiar with Soviet
intentions, and we are not much more informed at this
moment, either. Nonetheless, the administration's response
to the British announcement of their inability to maintain

support of Greece, and to the Russian diplomatic pressures
on Turkey concerning the Black Sea straits was a dramatic

but predictable continuation of the foreign policy shift

initiated shortly after the conclusion of the war. America

assumed Britain's responsibilities in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and maybe the only dissident was George

Kennan who regarded the Soviet threat as political and
economic. He opposed giving military assistance to Turkey
that might provoke the Russians, but supported an economic

and political aid to Greece 113

.
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After consulting Harriman, Under Secretary of State
Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Truman decided
to appear before the Congress. Vandenberg also summoned
a

meeting of the Republican Policy Conference and asked the
Senators to endorse the President's proposal. Truman knew
that the Congress would not support his aid plan unless

confronted with the situation in a way that they could not
reject it. Meeting with Congressional leaders on February
27,

Acheson presented a dramatic situation in the

Mediterranean and all over the world, and although the
participants of the meeting were impressed, Vandenberg still
insisted that in order to secure success the President
should "scare the hell out of the people". When Marshall

received the draft of Truman's speech the President

was to

deliver before the Congress, he felt that there was a little
too much anti - Communism in it, but his reservations were

rejected on the basis of the arguments mentioned above.

Kennan and Bohlen were also taken by surprise by the
sweeping and uncompromising tone of the speech 114

.

The Congress was confronted with a situation where

opposition to the bill meant appeasing Communism 115

.

Despite

this, many critics feared that the United States would

commit itself to an excessively broad policy of intervention

and foreign aid, and that bypassing the United Nations and
114
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acting against the Soviet Union would lead
to war.
Vandenberg also joined the critics, since he saw
bi-

partisanship violated because the President had
not
consulted the Republicans prior to making his
decision about
the aid. He also claimed that the administration
was too
slow in dealing with Britain's economic decline,
and the
situation was so grave that only a Truman-Stalin meeting
could save the possibilities of an American- Soviet

cooperation 116

.

While some Senators accused the President of

endangering the security of the United States by breaking
with the traditional foreign policy line, others, like

Senator Fulbright said the bill did not go far enough and an
overall Middle East policy was necessary. He called for the

clarification of the American determination to resist "any
attempt on Russia's part to destroy liberty and freedom",
and said that it was necessary to establish a Federation of

Europe 117

.

Senator Claude Pepper, who rallied behind Wallace's

movement objected to the belligerent tone of Truman's speech
and feared that the bill would make reconciliation with

Russia impossible. Wallace himself accused the President of
"whipping up anti - Communist hysteria", while others were

afraid that the aid program would necessitate instituting
strict controls and would result in strengthening the
116
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executive power. To reassure uneasy
legislators and the
public, Acheson at the committee hearings
placed limits on
the universal character of the
proposal by binding it to the
current issue in the Mediterranean, while
senators
Vandenberg and Connally drafted amendments
enabling the
United Nations to terminate the program if
it considered it
unnecessary or unfavorable. By passing the bill
isolationism
was broken in America, and Truman took the
offensive
in the

Cold War

118
.

In a parallel legislation to extend UNRRA aid
to European

countries, which plan lacked the strong anti - Communist

potential, the administration had to face a much more

substantial resistance, and the originally proposed $350

million was cut to $200 million 119

.

The peace treaties with former Nazi-allies did not

represent a major issue and did not stir significant debate.
The main topic of the objections raised by Senator Fulbright
Weis

that endorsing Soviet gains would leave countries,

especially Italy, vulnerable to Communism, as the example of
Hungary showed in May, 1947 120

.

The Plan to unify the armed forces under one department

had been on the agenda since the end of the war, but

consensus between the Army and the Navy was not reached
118
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until January,

1947, and then after a short Congressional

debate the National Security Act was passed 121

.

Having finished the most important foreign
policy issues,
Congress set to put the final gloss on its domestic
agenda.

The Republicans managed to settle their factional
disputes
that had prevented them from presenting controversial

proposals. Truman also had to break with his conciliatory

posture since he strongly opposed the Republican views on
the upcoming issues 122

.

Furthermore, in the summer of 1947

he was advised to decide what he wanted to do with Wallace,

because since the passing of the Truman Doctrine and the

announcement of the Marshall Plan there had been a growing
distance between the policy of the administration and

Wallace's declarations. In a memo to Clark Clifford, sent by
his aide George Elsey the administration was called for

action. Elsey perceived a substantial crowd of supporters

behind Wallace consisting of isolationists, conservatives,
and Communists, who feared that Truman's policies meant war.

Elsey also considered Wallace a potential Presidential

candidate for 1948 123

.

Wallace was gaining some followers

even in the Congress in the person of Senator Glen Taylor
and Senator Claude Pepper, and he could be proud of enjoying
121
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the support of other distinguished personalities,

like

Albert Einstein who had expressed his admiration about

Wallace's policies in a letter written in September,
194 6 124

.

inip9-ct

of this shift within the administration toward

a tougher stance concerning the Wallace affair was certainly

present at the Presidential veto of the Taft-Hartley bill in
June,

1947. Traditionally the firmest support for the

Democratic Party came from the organized labor, but certain
measures of Truman during the 1946 railroad strikes had

alienated the workers from the Democrats. After the Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley bill, the probability that workers
would line up behind a third party became very high. The
bill provided for sweeping changes in labor policy.

Jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts were
prohibited, inter- industry bargaining was banned, and rights
of the unions were curbed. Although major provisions were

amended out, the veto was still inevitable for Truman to
enhance his image as the defender of the common man. Wallace
himself admitted that the veto was an important action to
save the support of organized labor for the Democrats 125

.

The central issue of Truman's foreign policy in the fall
of 1947 and in the spring of 1948 was the European Recovery

Program. Secretary of State Marshall late in April, 1947,
124
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upon arriving home from an abortive Foreign Ministers'
Conference in Moscow presented to the President a report

outlining his conviction that the Soviets were determined
to
take advantage of Europe's helpless economic situation. In

Moscow Marshall came to the conclusion that Stalin, looking
over to Europe saw that the best way to advance Soviet

interests in the West was to let matters drift, let the

devastated European economy go bankrupt by intransigence and
-^^fusing to cooperate. The Generalissimo showed indifference

about the futility of the negotiations:

"We may agree the

next time, or if not then, the time after that". The plan to

combat the situation was first outlined by Acheson in a

speech delivered on May

publicity 126

8,

but which did not get much

.

Although Vandenberg and Eaton agreed on the necessity of
a large-scale aid program,

and Harold Stassen, Republican

Presidential aspirant also called the GOP to rise above
"petty grievances" and fixed opposition concerning that
issue,

the Marshall aid package still had a long way to go

till acceptance. First of all,

the Administration was not

prepared to include the Soviet Union and its satellites into
the program,

since it would have made it unacceptable for

the Congress. Although the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris

talks eliminated the greatest obstacle to the passage, the

Congress was still far from being convinced. The President
126
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as well was reserved in his declarations
until September

because the recent vetoes and amendments did
not create a
favorable atmosphere to stir isolationist sentiments
and
promote proposals requiring large expenses 127
.

But by September-October the Soviet Union appeared
more

hostile for the Americans. Numerous Congressmen returned
from their European trips with the first-hand experience
about the economic situation of the Old Continent, while
the

Soviets revived the Comintern which encouraged the Western

Communists to instigate strikes, especially in France and
Italy. Truman requested the Appropriations and Foreign

Affairs Committees to consider the need for and urgent aid
to Europe, and he signalled that $580 million was necessary

for France,

Italy, and Austria to survive the winter. He was

pressed by Clifford and others to summon a special session,
which he did calling the Congress to reconvene on November
17

.

Since July the special committee concluded their

investigations and the President could appear before the
Congress with concrete plans 128

.

During the special session only the interim aid was
discussed, because the lack of sufficient support in the

Congress prevented the administration from presenting a

large-scale assistance program. Senator Taft, and Clarence
Brown,

the Director of the Republican National Committee
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attacked Truman's policies in Germany because they wrecked
Europe, and now the American taxpayer was paying for the

mistakes. Other opponents emphasized inflationary problems,

and the rise in the cost of living. They reminded the

President that he had opposed socialism in Greece, but now
he was ready to promote it in Britain or France. Senators

Pepper and Taylor objected to the bill as a "weapon in an

ideological war", and wanted to send the proposition over to
the United Nations. Finally the bill for aid of $540 million

was passed. As a result of a Republican amendment an aid to

China was included in this sum at the expense of the

European countries 129

.

Separate treatment of the interim aid meant additional
expenses, but at the same time allowed the administration to

gain further support for the long-range plan, and the
President on December 19, 1947 asked the Congress to provide
$17 billion over a four year period for the European

Recovery Program 130

.

By the end of 1947 Truman succeeded in restoring his

liberal image, and public opinion endorsed his ventures in

foreign policy. Henry Wallace had no choice but to break

with the Democratic Party and join a new political movement.
The first indication in the direction of this shift came in
129
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early December, and he planned to
announce his decision
publicly before Truman's State of the
Union Message
scheduled for January 5 131
.

A major strategy recommendation to be
followed until the
elections was presented to Truman in November,

1947 by Clark

Clifford, who succeeded Samuel Rosenman
as special counsel
to the President in June, 1946, and
who was considered by
many the "top advisor to the Truman
administration". The

underlying suggestion of Clifford's memorandum
was that the
alliance of Southern conservatives, Western
progressives,

and big city labor should be strengthened in order
to be
successful at the 1948 elections. Clifford predicted

that

the GOP candidate would be Thomas Dewey, and Henry
Wallace

would run as a third party candidate with the support of
the
Communists. Clifford was strongly anti - Communist and since
1946 he had analyzed Soviet -American relations, which helped

shape the containment policy. He feared Wallace would take

away enough votes from the Democrats to permit a Republican
victory. He believed that poor relations with the Russians

would intensify, but during crises the American people

usually supports the President. An attack against Wallace
should be launched "whenever the moment is psychologically
correct" by pointing out his Communist connections, but some

channels must be left unblocked if he wanted to return to
the Democrats. Truman's role as commander- in- chief and
131
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coordinator of the foreign policy should
be emphasized,
since recently it had been Marshall
who had moved into the
foreground, but the voters in 1948
would decide about
Truman, not Marshall 132

.

Shortly after Wallace's announcement
on December 29
1947
about his candidacy on the Progressive
party's ticket,
attack against him intensified. Senator
Howard McGrath,
,

chairman of the Democratic National Committee
claimed "that
a vote for Wallace ... is vote for the
things for which
Stalin, Molotov, and Vishinsky stand". However,
the

Progressives seemed to be gaining strength. In February
they
won a Congressional seat in a special election
to fill in
a

vacancy, after which Senator Taylor announced he
would run

with Wallace as a Vice Presidential candidate 133
It was time for Truman,

.

who had been reserved so far, to

join the anti-Wallace choir. Meanwhile he took up action to
step on the offensive in the legislative area, as well. In
his State of the Union Message on January

7

,

1948 he

outlined a broad scope of actions about promoting human
rights, development of human and conservation of natural

resources, and raising the standard of living. Concerning

foreign policy issues the President expressed his continued
support for the United Nations and the economic

reconstruction of Europe. He insisted that he was "fighting
132
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poverty, hunger and suf fering
... striving to achieve
a
concord among the peoples ... (and)
this leads to peace - not
war”, directly rejecting
Wallace's charges. On February 2
he
sent his civil rights message
to the Congress to win over
the black vote, in which the
impact of the Wallace-

phenomenon was prominent 134

.

As far as the Marshall plan was
concerned,

in December

Vandenberg was still worried about the
prospects of the
large-scale aid program. As he wrote to
his
wife,

"our

friend Marshall is going to have a helluva
time down here
when he gets to his long-range plan".
Senator Taft was in
favor of a program of less extensive scope,
but he compared
Marshall's proposition to the Soviet five-year
plans.

Instead of the requested $6.6 billion for the
first fifteen
months Taft cited former President Hoover's opinion
that $4

billion was sufficient. However, after the coup in
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 had convinced twenty to
thirty hesitating Republicans, this amendment was turned
down in the Senate. During the House Foreign Affairs

Committee hearing the question of an aid to China reappeared
and received an endorsement from former Ambassador to Moscow

William Bullitt, former commander in the Far East General
Wedemeyer, and General MacArthur. Despite Marshall's
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objections more than $400 million was
appropriated for China
within the European Recovery Program 135
.

On March 17, in a special address
to the Congress and
later that day in his St. Patrick's
Day speech, Truman for
the first time accused the Soviet
Union of threatening
peace. He openly identified Wallace
with the Communists,
after the former secretary blamed the
Czechoslovakian coup
on the administration. According to
Wallace, it was a

natural reaction for the Soviet Union to
consolidate its
positions after a series of aggressive steps
taken by
Truman 136
.

In his St.

Patrick's Day speech the President touched

upon the signing of the Brussels Pact that happened
on the
same day, and gave it a very warm welcome, but he
also

perceived that the Brussels Pact was not enough and tried
to
get bi-partisan support for joining a peacetime military
^-lli^-tice

•

On April 27 Marshall, Under Secretary of State

Robert Lovett, Vandenberg, and Dulles met at Blair House and

agreed that a regional pact was needed and the Congress
should pass a resolution in favor of it. According to

Secretary Forrestal "the tactics would be to have this
action initiated by the Republicans and to have the ball

picked up immediately by the President". Lovett and
135
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Vandenberg drafted a resolution which was
passed shortly by
the Senate on June 11, and only
three weeks later the

administration began discussions with European
countries
about a military alliance 138
.

Meanwhile, further "cooling" of the Cold
War, the Berlin
Blockade, the success of the Marshall Plan
and the

Vandenberg resolution severely undermined Wallace's
approach
to foreign policy, which was the core of
his program.
He

made a final attempt in early May to save his
situation by
writing a letter to Stalin, but in the fall campaign
the

Progressives no longer posed a substantial threat to the

Democrats 139

.

In the final stage of the 1948 campaign the GOP adopted

the Vandenberg foreign policy plank that charged the

administration with lack of clarity and consistency. The
Democrats were criticized for the Yalta and Potsdam
agreements, because they allowed the Russians to control the
Kuriles, North Korea, and Manchuria, endangering Alaska and
the West Coast, and enabled them to cut Europe into two

creating instability and dictatorship. Despite these charges
foreign policy did not become a decisive issue in the

campaign 140
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CHAPTER

3

ASSESSMENT OF CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1948

As has been pointed out in the introductory
chapter, the

two most helpful methods to examine the impact of
internal

factors on foreign policy are to analyze regime

vulnerability and fragmentation.
Totalitarian regimes tend to be stable, especially if a
certain period of time has passed since their establishment.

Oppresssive regimes may gain power by either overthrowing a
democratic government, or as a continuation of an

undemocratic pattern of rule in a particular country. In the
latter case, the regime may consolidate its power more

rapidly than in the former. However, in both instances the

totalitarian leadership is highly vulnerable in its first
years of operation.
The communist government of the Soviet Union could not be

considered an unexperienced regime in 1945. It had been
ruling the country for more than twenty- five years, and most
of its top leaders had been in position since the 1920s. The

population had time to adapt to the expectations of the
communists. Stalin had finished the great purges and had

removed practically every element from every stratum of

society and the bureaucracy that had represented a potential
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threat to his power. This required
approximately 50 million
lives, but the regime was finally safe.

There had been no change in the top leadership
since the
mid- twenties No position in the government
or the
.

bureaucracy at any level was subject to competition.
There
were no political parties, there was basically
no political
life. The lack of constitutional and legal
procedures gave

ground to abuses of power without consequences

Accountability was not a factor in Soviet politics. Public
officials and the public were separated, with no
communication between them. There was no free press or radio
that could have revealed the real face of the system.

Journalists were members of the regime with political
functions to ensure that only one policy line was present in
the public mind.

If a grain of sand should still have gotten

into the machinery,

there was one of the most fearful secret

polices in history at the Party's disposal.
In short,

the Soviet regime was not exposed to a high

number of vulnerability factors. The only ones that were
present emerged from the effects of the war. As we have
discussed, a serious disintegrating process started in the

party and the society. The grip had to be eased, and it was
difficult to reinstitute it. The mere fact that the

dictatorship of the proletariat allied with the most hateful
imperialist states shook the ideological basis of the power
of the Party. There was a considerable expectation in the
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society that Stalin would not return to
the pre-war
routines. As a matter of course, the very
nature of the
communist system did not allow the continuation

of a freer

atmoshphere

In general,

democratic regimes are more vulnerable than

totalitarian ones. The political group that controls
the
government has to compete for power with other
political
formations in regular elections. They are bound to be
replaced if their power bases shrink or if their opponents
gain more influence than they possess. There is a change
at
the top if the ruling group violates the written and

unwritten rules of the political game. Furthermore, politics
takes place under the continuous attention of the public.
The population or the electorate judges the leadership

either directly on the way political decisions affect their
lives,

or indirectly through the picture the free media

projects about it.
Being a democratic country, these remarks apply to the

United States, as well. The period this thesis treats was

especially one when the party of government could not feel
its power entirely secure. The Democrats had been in the

White House and holding a majority in the Congress for more
than a decade. Although they were unable to grab the

presidency before another seven years, the Republicans were
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clearly getting more popular, and in fact
they gained a
majority in the Congress in 1946.
Additionally, in 1945 the Democrats lost one
of their
greatest assets, Franklin D. Roosevelt, a leader
who had
been elected president an unprecedented four
times. The new
president was far less charismatic than his predecessor

and,

most importantly, was not identified closely with
the New
Deal,

the political magic word that meant an almost

automatic election victory for whoever put it on its flag
in
the 1940s.

Furthermore, the country had just been through a costly

and exhausting world war, and although its domestic economic

effects were clearly more positive than negative, it

required an enormous effort of demobilization and

reorganization
Finally,

there is probably no other country where the

mass media has greater influence than in America. The press
and the radio stations already in the 1940s were hungry for

every piece of information. The public and private life of
the most low- ranked politician took place in front of the

entire country, and no one of them could afford to make

mistakes
On the basis of the preceding observations, we may claim
that there were several vulnerability factors the governing

regime in the United States had to take into account.
However, the overall American political system, the liberal
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democracy based on representation and freedom
was not
vulnerable. Among the major political groups
competing for
power there was not a single one that aimed to
overthrow the
prevailing order. Democratic institutions, market
economy,

and free enterprise were among the most cherished
values
that no significant party dared to question. The
replacement
of governments might take place every four years,

but the

entire process followed time honored constitutional

regulations and affected only the top political positions.
Additionally, the institutions of the state were legitimate.
As far as vulnerability is concerned, to conclude the

above discussion, the regime in the United States was

exposed to several factors that diminished its safety, but
the ultimate political order was stable.

The other crucial point of view to be analyzed in order
to understand the relationship of internal conditions and

foreign policy is regime fragmentation. As we elaborated on
it earlier,

the concept denotes the existence of competing

individuals, institutions, and parties within a regime, each
of which demands a share in the decisionmaking process.

Furthermore, a single leader's ability to control the

political sphere is also a significant element of regime

fragmentation

Any discussion of personalities in the Soviet Union

between the 1920s and 1950s must center around Yosif Stalin.
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Opinions vary concerning the extent Stalin
could have his
own way in the leadership. The picture
is more subtle than
it is generally presented. On the
one hand, Stalin was an
unquestioned master. Series of legends and an
entire cult of
personality were constructed around him. He was
respected
and feared above any power. Political conspiracies
in the

background generally were not plotted vertically
against
him,

but horizontally among the secondary factions who

competed for his grace. On the other hand, he was aging
and
more and more exhausted. He was no longer able to devote
equal and scrupulous attention to each segment of the

country as he had been before the war. His illness attacked

him periodically, and then he was compelled to withdraw from
his duties completely for weeks.
As far as rank and renown were concerned, Stalin was

followed by the longest serving Politburo members. Molotov,
Andreyev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan had been on that body

since the twenties, and Stalin had practically no means to

eliminate them. However, he probably did not even have to
concern himself about them. Despite their eminence they did
not participate actively in the power struggles.

According to the main argument of the thesis, the third
line in the leadership consisting of Zhdanov, Malenkov,
Beriya, and Voznesenskii

,

was the most dynamic, the most

dangerous from Stalin's point of view, and the most
effective in influencing key decisions. We have argued that
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Zhdanov patronized forces of relative moderation
during
1945-1946. During this period he adopted a fairly
relaxed
view on world affairs. As it can be inferred from his
public
speeches and policies, he saw no danger of a new war and

considered the division within the Grand Alliance to be
horizontal, not vertical, that is not between blocs of
states, but between certain elements within the states which

favored conflict. Voznesenskii appeared also relatively

moderate in 1946, calling for establishing balance between
heavy industry and consumer production. However, by the
summer of 1947, as the Cold War tensions were rising high,
and because their position in the Party started to
deteriorate, this foreign policy stance proved no longer
viable, and they adopted a tougher approach. At the

Cominform meeting in September, 1947 and in the campaign on
the economic front initiated against the views of Yevgenii

Varga,

Zhdanov and Voznesenskii were the central characters.

The profile of the Cominform that was given to it after the

Malenkov group had gained the upper hand in the struggle
showed that Zhdanov still advocated the possibility of

various ways towards communism. Malenkov and Beriya already
in 1946 placed emphasis on international dangers and called

for establishing a stronger defense 141

.

It was not necessary for all personalities in the

Politburo to rally behind one of the groupings. Bulganin,
141
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etc.
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Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov remained
uncommitted to
either side, though in particular issues they
had to join
one of them to achieve their goals. After the
causes had
been accomplished, they always withdrew to the
middle.

Bulganin participated in Stalin's assault on the
army when
he became a political deputy minister of the Armed
Services.

Khrushchev was called back to Moscow in 1949 to
counterweight the dominance of the revived Malenkov
group 142

;

Mikoyan, as Commissar of Foreign Trade, was the

chairman of the committee that investigated the dismantling
of the German industries 143

.

Molotov praised the efforts of

the Leningrad leadership during the war and was one of the

main figures of the party revival. He and Zhdanov were the
father figures of the Nazi - Bolshevik pact, but whereas

Zhdanov was made the scapegoat, Molotov's diplomatic skills
were useful for Stalin. He put distance between himself and

Zhdanov and joined Malenkov and Beriya to suggest to Stalin
that he send Zhdanov to Leningrad. In 1945-1947 he

maneuvered back to Zhdanov, but without irreversible
commitments, although in 1949 during the Leningrad affair he
was removed from the top of the Foreign Ministry 144

.

Stalin himself during 1945 and 1946 supported the more

moderate approach. After realizing that Zhdanov's
142
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predominance in the apparatus and his alliance
with Tito had
become more than dangerous for him he started
to back
Malenkov and the fast homogenization of Eastern
Europe,

simultaneously maintaining his friendliness toward
the West
throughout 1947 and 1948.

Taking a look at the personalities in the immediate

postwar American political life, we find a president in the
center who did not gain the office through election. He was
not new to politics having served as a public official for

years at the local level and two terms as a United States
Senator. Nevertheless, most of his close advisors had uneasy

feelings as to whether he would be able to handle foreign

affairs effectively. It need be noted that Truman was not

entirely inexperienced in that area, either: he was chairman
of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense.

As to the formation of his beliefs, Harry Truman took an

early interest in history, participated in World War

I

in

Europe, and his formative years from a political point of

view coincided with the failure of the League of Nations and
the aggressions committed by the Central Powers in the early

thirties. He was a strong supporter of FDR and the New Deal,
but he was coming from an entirely different background, a

Missouri middle class family.
The president had always been strongly anti - communist

,

as

had been most of his top colleagues. We may group the major
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politicians into three categories, as far as their
attitudes
toward foreign policy were concerned. In the first
group we
can place those who ever made pronouncements that
could
be

interpreted as shows of a compromising stance in relation
to
the Soviet Union.
We have cited remarks of Secretary Stimson, General

Marshall

(pp.

58-59)

,

General Eisenhower

(p.

61)

.

Their

opinions, however, were prompted by a concern about the war
effort, or were pronounced shortly after the war when

cooperation between America and the Soviet Union had taken
place. Another stance, voiced by Secretary Ickes

(p.

61)

was typical of those who were either not experts on foreign
issues, or had served in the government during the

Depression when as a matter of course those countries the
governments of which allegedly had assumed a greater

responsibility for the social welfare of their citizens had
been looked upon with sympathy. A third pattern of attitude,
similar to that represented by Joseph Davies and Harry
Hopkins (pp. 61-62), characterized diplomats during the war
who had been elevated by FDR as part of his strategy of

suppressing experts on Russia who might have jeopardized the

operation of the Grand Alliance.

A very important factor that was clearly friendly towards
the Soviet Union was the American public. President

Roosevelt's efforts after the US entered the war to push the
real face of communism to the background were very
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successful. Russia was not perceived as a country
that was
just as dangerous as Nazi Germany, and the public
was

certainly not ready to substitute Uncle Joe for Hitler,
at
least not before the end of 1946. But, as always,
public
opinion shifted back to its original position after the

media image of the Soviet Union changed.
The only notable political character who was a leftist-

isolationist and an apologist of communism was Henry Wallace

accompanied by his Progressive followers inside and outside
the Congress. According to Truman, Wallace was the best

Secretary of Agriculture the United States had ever had.
However, his

performance at the end of his career diverted

the attention of the contemporary and subsequent generations

from his great past accomplishments. The former vice

president did not start out as a communist sympathizer. He
was a Cabinet member of the most powerful capitalist
country,

responsible for important economic policies. We

have sufficient grounds to assume that his foreign policy

position throughout 1946 and at the beginning of 1947 was
based on a genuine concern about the increasingly unstable
world order, and he was occupied with a quest for resolving
the problem of atomic weapons.
As opposed to this, as he became more and more active

asserting his ideas both in the domestic and the
international arena, he could no longer maintain an

unaffiliated position towards those whose cause he was
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defending. He found himself entirely
isolated in the
Democratic Party, and as a matter of course was
placed both
by himself and by the public to the left
edge
of the

political stage. He could not avoid an actual
involvement
with communists. As we have referred to it
earlier, his

political opponents did not fail to point out his
links with
the communists during the 1948 presidential campaign.
We may claim that all the other significant personalities

who were in positions where they could affect foreign
policy

decisions (Acheson, Bohlen, Byrnes, Clifford, Harriman,
Kennan, Vandenberg, Taft, Dulles, Eaton, Churchill), were

consistently anti - communist and opposed any appeasement of
the Soviets during the period under discussion here.
Of these we need to emphasize the influence of Averell

Harriman and Winston Churchill. The ambassador from the

beginning insisted on a firm stance toward the Russians. He
was the American politician who established the closest

contact with Stalin and who was allowed to see the

Generalissimo on a regular basis. It was characteristic of
his prominence that the president selected him as the new

Secretary of Commerce after the firing of Henry Wallace.
If there was anyone who favored a tougher approach in

relation to the Soviet Union than Harriman, it was the
British Prime Minister. Although both Roosevelt and Truman
held Churchill in high esteem, they had reservations about

Britain as a colonial empire and Churchill as an old
107

fashioned conservative leader. Truman was
disturbed by
Churchill's demands to retain the territories
occupied by
American and British troops at the end of the
war, and to
hold the Potsdam Conference early; nevertheless
he did not
yield to the Soviets in San Francisco and Potsdam,
partly at
Churchill's influence.
There were two major incidents between 1945 and 1948
that
took place between leading personalities over foreign
policy
issues. The first one started in October 1945 at the London

Foreign Ministers' Conference and culminated after the

Moscow meeting in December, but it had its roots back in the
1944 presidential elections. As we have analyzed it earlier,

Byrnes blamed Truman for not getting the vice presidency.
This episode made him assume after being appointed Secretary
of State that he was entitled to an independent position in

the Cabinet, and started to engage in adventurous

negotiations at the above two conferences. Truman was
furious because of not having been consulted, because he did
not agree with the deals Byrnes had made and, ultimately,

because he felt the Secretary did not accept his supremacy
in decision making.

In this manner it is clear that Byrnes's

attempts were motivated by his intention to assert himself
as an equal authority in foreign affairs rather than by a

special inclination to appease the Russians.
The Wallace episode did not involve personal conflicts.

Unlike the Byrnes affair, it was based on serious policy
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differences that could not be resolved
by a simple
replacement. After Wallace left the Cabinet,
Truman no
longer had any control over him. Wallace
took advantage of
his image as a prominent New Dealer and
former vice
president relying on the residual public sympathy
towards
the Soviet Union and the growing concern
about the unstable
world order. Being highly unpopular and lacking
extensive
public opinion data, Truman had to take Wallace
very
seriously, especially after the former secretary
announced
his bid for the presidency. It was necessary for
Truman to

re-establish himself as the protector of the common man,
otherwise the non-Republican vote would have been more

evenly split between the Democrats and the Progressives,

resulting in an automatic Republican victory, as it was

prognosticated by the Elsey and Clifford memos noted
earlier. The president as part of a large-scale strategy

vetoed the Taft -Hartley bill and prepared his radical civil
rights proposal to counterbalance the Progressive influence.
In foreign policy,

the main area of their competition, a

clear example of Wallace's presence was Truman's attempt to
find accommodation with the Soviets through a direct, secret

negotiation, but the idea was dropped when Marshall

threatened to quit after he had been informed about the

planned mission of Chief Justice Fred Vinson to Stalin 145

145
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The second factor that determines
the degree of regime
fragmentation is the presence of different
institutions
which strive to assert their power in
the face of or beside
the others
In the Soviet Union,

as in most totalitarian countries,

there was no separation of power. Theoretically,
there
existed a legislative body, an executive,
and courts, but in
practice there was only one power center that
had a say in
politics. The Party was an all-encompassing
organization
that controlled every sphere of the society.
Both at the

national and the local levels, decisions were made
by the
Party leaders and were given out as commands to the

different institutions. Officials like government members
or
city council chairpersons functioned as mere tools in the
hands of the Party. They had no right to initiate policies;
the plans described by the Party had to be carried out

without questioning.
As we have pointed out however,

in addition to the

totalitarian pattern of policymaking there were other
aspects at work, as well. Although Party orders were

expected to be implemented servilely, the leaders were aware
how important the efficient operation of the bureaucracy
was.

Keeping the largest country in the world under total

control required an immense and at least to some extent

organized army of officials. For this reason, there was an

unspoken but unambiguous trade-off between the Party and the
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bureaucracy that insured that the interests of
both sides
were represented in policy.
Furthermore, as chains of personal subordinances
similar
to feudal hierarchies evolved, decisions came
about
as

results of compromises between the individual members
of
these chains. On the one hand, in order for officials
to get

opportunities for promotion, they needed to identify
themselves with the positions of their superiors. On the
other hand, leaders were compelled to please their

subordinates to build up power bases that enabled them to
assert themselves in the face of other factions.
The other factors that participated in the largely

informal Soviet policy making process were also

characteristic of totalitarian regimes. First, it was the
enormous military establishment that ultimately made the
Soviet Union a superpower. Compared to other sectors of the
country,

it was relatively developed,

although its main

strength was given to it by the gigantic standing army. In

budgetary and other key political decision the interests of
the army always represented top priority. Second, a

repressive society is unthinkable without a mighty secret
police. The NKVD, later MVD or KGB, stood entirely above the
law,

and in some instances even over the Party. Its power

permeated frontiers, and helped keep the orbit countries
obedient. Third, the Soviet Union was one of the most

industrialized countries in the world. The smooth
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maintenance of the military required a
full-speed industrial
production. For this reason, heavy industry
always took
precedence over the other sectors of the economy.
On the basis of the above observations we
may claim that
the Soviet regime was fragmented to a small
degree
in the

absence of competing political parties. The
fragmentation
that existed originated from the rival interest
groups and

institutions, but their influence was always subordinated
to
the ultimate supremacy of the Party, which maintained
a

public posture of agreement.

In the United States there are two basic institutions

that share responsibility for making and implementing

decisions: the president and the Congress. Originating from
the division of power which is the ultimate characteristic
of democracies,

political decisions are made by the

executive and the legislative branch in accordance with the

provisions of the Constitution which is supervised by the
Supreme Court. Since in the United States the president is
the prime diplomat and the chief negotiator, American

foreign policy is fundamentally formulated by the executive
branch. However, resulting from the treaty approving,

budgetary, and war declaring responsibilities of the
Congress, successful foreign policy cannot be pursued

without cooperation with the legislative body 146
146
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The first four postwar years of politics
in the United
States can clearly be divided into two periods.
Concerning
foreign developments the years 1945 and 1946
passed in the

belief that the successful establishment of the
United
Nations would eventually create the possibility for

cooperation among the great powers and a stable, democratic
world order would be achieved. However, by the end of
1946,

because of the Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and the
futility and atmosphere of the negotiations, President

Truman was impelled to institute a bottom-up change in the
basic American foreign policy tactics. Throughout 1947 and
1948,

gaining the support of the Congress, his

administration laid the groundwork for an unparalleled break
with the isolationist warnings of President Washington, that
reached its climax on April

4,

1949, when the United States,

for the first time in its history, became the member of a

peacetime entangling military alliance.
The division of Truman's first term into two parts can be

applied to domestic politics, as well, and the applicability
is not accidental

.

Because in the Seventy Ninth Congress the

Democratic Party enjoyed a majority, and significant foreign

policy decisions requiring Congressional authorization were
not made,

the legislative branch did not play a central role

in foreign policy during 1945 and 1946. These two years were

taken up by the long and generally fruitless attempts to
save the East -West cooperation, and formulate a novel
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approach to the changed world within the
administration.
Similarly to the leading Soviet politicians who
basically
saw no possibility for an unaltered Soviet -American
alliance, the overwhelming majority of President
Truman's

advisors opposed the continuation of Roosevelt's wartime

appeasing tactics. The year 1947 brought not only the
embodiment of the previous years' speculations, but also the

Eightieth Congress with a strong Republican majority. These
two simultaneous changes elevated the Congress to occupy a

more influential stance on foreign policy. This was also the

period when the tacit alliance of Southern Democrats and
conservative Republicans became tangible for the first time.
This situation was not to favor an effective foreign

plicy formation. The program of the GOP laid little emphasis
on foreign issues. The Republicans were strongly anti-

communist and internationalist, but unwilling to devote the
taxpayers' money to ventures abroad. To press the major

lagislation in the foreign policy area through Congress the
president was compelled to exaggerate the communist threat.
Those proposals that lacked the vehement anti- communist

potential got often stuck in the House.
However,

the attitude of the Congress was not always

totally uncompromising. The leader of congressional
Republicans, Robert Taft conceded the number one position on

foreign issues to Senator Arthur Vandenberg in exchange for
the latter's support in the domestic field. The majority of
114

the Republican representatives rallied behind
the

bipartisanship of Vandenberg and Congressman Eaton,
and
Congress in close cooperation with the President
created the
foundations of the American foreign policy that was followed
throughout the Cold War.

115

CHAPTER

4

CONCLUSION

As a final conclusion we may claim
that internal

conditions did constrain foreign policy
both in the Soviet
Union and the United States. Our case
studies have provided
examples for the interrelation of these
spheres and
demonstrated the differences prevalent in totalitarian
and
democratic regimes in this respect.
The totalitarian Soviet regime was relatively
stable, the
top leadership had been in power practically for
a quarter
of a century,

and thanks to the great purges of the thirties

"reactionary" elements had been removed from the society.

Accountability was not a factor in Soviet politics and the
secret police served as a safety valve in case the previous

components broke down.
Regime fragmentation was low; the power of Yosif Stalin
was one of the most pervasive in history. A strict hierarchy

and long- serving "sacred cows" ensured that the state of
a-ffairs was not shaken up from below.

Furthermore, the

relatively effective operation of an immense bureaucracy and
the absence of the separation of power and political

competition further decreased fragmentation.
Factors that increased vulnerability and added to regime

fragmentation were few in the Soviet Union in the late
forties. The most important ones were the effects of the war
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that were possibly the most
devastating exactly in this
country. Despite the relatively
monolithic character of the
communist leadership, several patterns
of policymaking

existed that involved not only the
tyrannic commands of
Stalin but also trade-offs within the
bureaucracy

and in and

around the Politburo. Fragmentation from
an institutional
point of view emerged from the general
lack of legitimacy in
the political sphere and the existence
of rival power groups
with parochial interests, although the
influence of
these

was always subordinated to the supremacy of
the Party.
In the United States internal conditions
and foreign

policy were more closely intertwined. In our discussion
we
have sorted out a number of regime vulnerability
and
fragmentation factors. Individual regimes were relatively

vulnerable politically. They were compelled to compete for
power periodically with other participants of politics and
could be removed from power if circumstances changed. As a
result of the continuous media attention the information

flow between the government and the governed was two-

directional. In the immediate postwar years the party of

government was losing power and was divided internally
largely as a result of the death of its long-time leader.
The war not only made America the number one power in the

world but also caused several serious difficulties that were
almost as hard to tackle as the war itself.
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The character of the American
political life and the
nature of the hierarchy made the
relationship of leading

personalities to each other and to the
affairs of the
country different from that in the
Soviet Union. Issues and
decisions were discussed publicly, and a
greater number
of

individuals and institutions could affect
their outcomes.
Political debates were normal phenomena and
could involve
problems of cardinal significance.
These circumstances, however, did not render
American
foreign policy arbitrary or impossible to
calculate.
Individual regimes were vulnerable but constitutional

democracy was not. There were a great number of
participants
that filtered foreign policy decisions but the
general

legitimacy made these decisions authentic and orderly.
We have seen that there were more vulnerability factors
in the United States and the American political regime
was

more fragmented than the Soviet one in the late nineteenforties

.

According to our previous premises this means that

American foreign policy was more constrained by internal
factors than Soviet foreign policy. This claim, supposedly,
has a dual consequence. It is more difficult to unfold the
real motives behind Soviet foreign policy behavior and to

infer from foreign policy decisions to domestic developments
and vice versa, whereas students of the two spheres of

American politics can mutually contribute to and draw from
each other's research.
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